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INTRODUCTION
When strict products liability first appeared on the scene some thirty-five
years ago, it was heralded as a boon to consumers whose claims to compensa-
tion had hitherto been frustrated by the law of sales.1 Warranty law, it was
said, worked fairly well in purely "commercial" transactions, but tort law did
a better job in cases where ordinary consumers suffered personal injuries or
property damage from defective products. 2 To be sure, defenders of war-
ranty law pointed out that the newly-drafted Uniform Commercial Code (the
"Code" or "U.C.C.") was much more consumer friendly than the old Uni-
form Sales Act.3 Nevertheless, the proponents of strict liability prevailed,
and to this day strict liability in tort remains the pre-eminent theory of prod-
ucts liability.
4
However, as the present century draws to a close, academic support for
the existing tort-based system of strict products liability appears to be reced-
ing.5 Indeed, some legal commentators have begun to suggest that the cur-
rent products liability system be scrapped and replaced with something
better.6 These fertile minds have been responsible for a number of novel and
ingenious proposals but, surprisingly, almost no one has suggested sales law
as a possible alternative to strict liability. I will attempt to remedy this over-
1. See generally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127-34 (1960) (discussing difficulties and disadvantages of ap-
plying concept of warranty to tort situations).
2. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) ("[R]ules defin-
ing and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions
cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured by their defec-
tive products .... ").
3. See Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionality of Section
402A, 44 TENN. L. REV. 205, 206 (1977) ("My general complaint is that section 402A has been
either unnecessary, if it did not undercut the Uniform Sales Act or the Code, or unconstitutional,
if it did."); Reed Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 485
(1974) ("[T]he Uniform Commercial Code preempts at least part of the domain claimed by
§ 402A.").
4. See Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39
Bun'. L. REV. 181, 194 (1991) ("As a result of Greenman and its progeny, and section 402A of
the Second Restatement of Torts, strict liability has become a widely accepted basis for liability
in products liability cases.").
5. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) ("The literature overflows with criticism, and anyone perus-
ing the law reviews in recent years might well come away believing that the predominant view is
that products liability has been a disaster.").
6. See infra Part I for a critique of strict products liability.
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sight by taking a fresh look at the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty
provisions.
This article is divided into five parts. Part I examines the shortcomings
of the current tort-based system of products liability. In this portion of the
article, I contend that strict liability does not necessarily promote product
safety, nor does it distribute product-related risks fairly or efficiently. Fi-
nally, I conclude that the present system of products liability is outrageously
expensive to administer, distributing less than fifty cents on the dollar to the
victims of product-related injuries.
In Part II, I argue that products liability should be viewed as a form of
insurance. In addition, I contend that products liability law should abandon
its traditional concern with product safety, broad risk-spreading, and correc-
tive justice, and instead focus on providing consumers with warranty/insur-
ance protection against product-related injuries at the lowest possible cost.
Part III examines some of the basic features of the Uniform Commercial
Code and identifies several assumptions that underlie the notion that a con-
tract-based products liability system can adequately protect consumer inter-
ests. The first assumption is that a contract-based liability regime will rely
primarily on express warranties, running directly from producer to consumer,
to carry out this insurance function. The implied warranty of
merchantability, even when modified or limited, requires buyers to purchase
a socially-mandated level of warranty or insurance protection whether they
desire it or not. Express warranties, on the other hand, allow the parties to
allocate product-related risks in a way that maximizes their utility. The sec-
ond assumption is that consumers have sufficient knowledge and bargaining
power to avoid being swindled or coerced by producers. This assumption is
supported by studies that focus on the behavior of markets, concluding that
producers respond to consumer preferences with respect to warranty/insur-
ance protection.
Part IV examines some of the Code's potential shortcomings. One con-
cern is privity of contract. According to traditional doctrine, warranty pro-
tection extends only to the original buyer and not to other parties who may
be injured by the product. Although the privity requirement has lost much of
its force during the past thirty years, it still can be troublesome. Another
problem is the Code's notice provision, which requires buyers to notify sell-
ers of breach of warranty within a reasonable time or lose their right to sue.
If this requirement was rigorously enforced it could strip unsophisticated
consumers of the warranty/insurance protection for which they bargained.
Disclaimers and warranty limitations constitute another pitfall. While
these concepts can serve a useful and benign purpose by allowing the parties
to adjust the level of insurance coverage provided, they also can operate in
an oppressive manner against ignorant or economically-disadvantaged buy-
ers. The Code's statute of limitations is another sticking point. Unlike the
statute of limitations in tort cases, which begins to run when the plaintiff's
injury occurs, or in some cases, when the injury is discovered, a breach of
warranty claim under the Code's statute of limitation typically begins to run
1998]
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as soon as the goods are delivered. Because this limitation period is rela-
tively short, it may run out before any injury occurs, thereby leaving the vic-
tim without a remedy.
In Part V, I consider whether the problems described in part IV are
serious enough to require correction. The first issue is privity. Because I
envision a system of express warranties issuing directly from producers to
consumers, I conclude that both vertical privity and horizontal privity re-
quirements ought to be eliminated for consumer-related warranty claims. In
the absence of privity requirements, the parties themselves can decide war-
ranty coverage issues. A second concern is the notice requirement of U.C.C.
section 2-607 (3)(a). Although this provision is useful and reasonable in com-
mercial transactions, it may serve as a trap for the unwary consumer. There-
fore, I recommend eliminating the notice requirement in transactions
between producers and ordinary consumers.
A third area of controversy involves disclaimers and limitations on rem-
edies. These contractual devices are essential to the furnishing of efficient
levels of insurance protection by producers. I assume that competitive forces
within the market will discourage producers from scaling back their insur-
ance coverage without a corresponding reduction in product prices. If this
does not occur, however, the courts can invalidate exculpatory provisions by
invoking the Code's unconscionability provisions.
The final, and most intractable, problem is the Code's statute of limita-
tions. The Code's four-year date-of-sale rule may be too short where per-
sonal injury claims are involved. On the other hand, the date-of-injury and
discovery doctrine approaches employed by tort law may keep the producer
on the hook for too long. I conclude that the traditional date-of-sale rule be
retained. With the exception of automobiles and major appliances, most con-
sumer goods have relatively short useful lives and producers can offer ex-
press warranties for future performance under section 2-725 (2) for products
that present long-term risks to their users.
Therefore, I conclude that the Uniform Commercial Code, with certain
minor changes, might indeed be preferable to the present tort-based system,
particularly if we view products liability as an insurance mechanism rather
than as an instrument of accident cost avoidance or unlimited risk
distribution.
I. A CRITIQUE OF STRICT PRODUCTs LIABILITY
The current operation of products liability law has generated significant
criticism.7 Many argue that strict liability has caused unwarranted price in-
7. See William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 639, 639 ("Current products liability law is a mess. Its foundation is flawed, its
content is exceedingly complex, and its effect on personal injury litigation is pernicious.").
[Vol. 71
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creases 8 and undermined America's competitive position in world markets. 9
In addition, some legal scholars allege that strict tort liability has destabilized
the liability insurance industry. 10 Finally, it has been suggested that the ex-
isting liability regime has siphoned money away from product research and
development,1 ' discouraged companies from introducing new products,
12
and even caused some firms to remove existing products from the market.
13
A. Accident Cost Avoidance
A number of legal commentators have expressed doubts about the abil-
ity of strict products liability to control accident costs. Strict liability is sup-
posed to encourage producers to make safer products. 14 According to
conventional wisdom, product sellers, and particularly manufacturers, are in
a good position to make their products safe, 15 but have little incentive to
invest in product safety as long as the costs of product-related injuries are
borne by others.16 The imposition of strict liability on producers supposedly
8. See Tim Moore, Comment, Comment K Immunity to Strict Liability: Should Prescription
Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REV. 707, 718 (1989) (describing effect of tort liability on price
of DTP vaccine).
9. See William A. Worthington, The "Citadel" Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the Policy
of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 245 (1995) ("While not the sole culprit, strict tort liability has
been a significant contributor to the decline in competitiveness of American industry.").
10. See Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further
Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333, 338 (1993) ("Some features operating within the tort
system, however, appear to aggravate the problem of unaffordable (or unavailable) insurance
coverage.").
11. See Worthington, supra note 9, at 246 ("Vast resources are diverted from research and
development to pay the spiraling cost of defending lawsuits.").
12. See C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 97 (1983) ("Be-
cause manufacturers cannot predict the standards by which their products will be judged, they
may be reluctant to introduce new designs or innovative products."); Marcus L. Plant, Strict
Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24
TENN. L. REV. 938, 950 (1957) ("A less obvious but perhaps more socially perilous result which
will follow the inauguration of strict liability, is the impeding of progress in the development of
new products and the improvement of old ones.").
13. See Pennington Parker Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts
Co-Regulate?, 43 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 85, 119 (1988) ("In addition to chilling new remedies,
litigation has already forced some manufacturers to remove useful products from the market.");
George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 500 (1987) ("[A] recent Con-
ference Board survey of the nation's 500 largest corporations showed that twenty-five percent
had removed products or services from markets in response to increased corporate tort
liability.").
14. See Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability
"Revolution": Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONz. L. REV. 251,
274 (1991-92) ("Strict product liability induces manufacturers to make safer products.").
15. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 681, 711 (1980) ("Manufacturers today, especially those of products that are technologi-
cally complex, often are in a far better position than consumers to discover, evaluate, and act
upon, dangers that inhere in the products that they make and sell.").
16. See Stephen F. Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort,
106 HARV. L. REV. 932, 933 (1993) ("Thus, but for tort liability, producers would have inade-
quate incentives to compete either in reducing risk or in offering warranties.").
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corrects this problem by forcing manufacturers to choose between paying
damages for product-related injuries or preventing them from occurring in
the first place. 17 Presumably, a producer will spend money on product safety
as long as the marginal cost of additional safety does not exceed the marginal
reduction of expected tort liability achieved by such efforts.
18
Not everyone agrees with this view,19 however, and there are good rea-
sons to question whether tort law really can influence producer behavior to
any significant degree.20 In the first place, corporate managers often see lia-
bility standards as vague and unpredictable.21 Thus, instead of creating eco-
nomic incentives, tort law standards often leave corporate decisionmakers
befuddled and demoralized. Moreover, the corporate reward structure en-
courages decisionmakers to discount or ignore risks, particularly long-term
risks.2 2 To make matters worse, corporate managers frequently have a hard
time communicating with lower-level employees. 23 As a result, accident-cost
avoidance policies promulgated by upper-level management are not always
passed down through the chain of command. Finally, the deterrent effect of
tort liability is often weakened by the existence of liability insurance.
24
17. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U. WEST. ONT.
L. REV. 111, 128 (1979) ("[Strict liability] provides an incentive for those engaged in a particular
activity to make it safer, for by doing so, their costs will be lower.").
18. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprison-
ment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983) ("[A] manufacturer will re-
spond to threatened liability by investing in safety up to, but not beyond, the point at which the
marginal costs of the investment equal the marginal costs of accidents thereby avoided.").
19. See Powers, supra note 7, at 644 ("It is debatable, both analytically and empirically,
whether strict liability increases product safety, much less whether it tends to optimize product
safety."); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1351 (1981) ("Again, the adoption of the strict liability standard is likely to have increased the
rate of personal injury losses from defective products.").
20. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current Concep-
tion of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 775 (1987) ("[T]he argument that tort law can allo-
cate to injurers the correct costs of injuries and thereby prompt the correct level of safety
investment seems manifestly implausible.").
21. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558, 566 (1985)
("Even those with broad awareness of tort liability have many reasons to see it as highly
unpredictable.").
22. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1027, 1040 (1990) ("The decision to discover and address possible long-term risks requires
that costs be incurred in the short term, and managers with an interest in profits now will be
disinclined to dedicate firm resources to programs the benefits of which will accrue to the firm, if
at all, only in the distant future."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort
Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1301 (1980) ("[I]ndividual deci-
sionmakers tend to emphasize the short-term consequences of their decisions and to deem-
phasize the long-term consequences .... ").
23. See Fred A. Manuele, Product Safety Program Management, 2 J. PROD. LIAB. 97, 98
(1978) ("Executives responsible for decisions affecting product safety do not always have ade-
quate communication with each other on the subject .... ").
24. See Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort
Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 46 (1980) ("The ubiquity of liability insurance is a fact; it puts into
question the practicability of market deterrence in almost all accident cases.").
1998] REPLACING STRICT LIABILITY
When insurance is readily available, manufacturers whose products cause an
excessive number of injuries are able to shift some of their liability to other
members of the insurance pool. 25 Thus, it cannot be said with any confidence
that strict products liability necessarily enhances product safety.
B. Loss-Spreading
Strict liability also is supposed to shift accident costs to those who can
spread them more efficiently.26 Advocates of strict liability contend that
loss-spreading is desirable because it reduces the "secondary" costs of acci-
dents.2 7 Business enterprises generally are considered to be better loss-
spreaders than individual consumers.28 Not only can producers obtain more
comprehensive insurance coverage than individuals, 29 but they also can pass
their insurance costs on to the consuming public by raising prices.30 In the-
ory, that is the way loss-spreading is supposed to work.
It is by no means self-evident, however, that loss-spreading is best
achieved by imposing liability upon producers. 31 First of all, producer liabil-
ity often duplicates other loss-spreading mechanisms, such as workers' com-
25. See Sugarman, supra note 21, at 575-76 ("So long as individual firms pay on the same
basis, individual accident records and safety measures will have no impact on premiums.").
26. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1120 ("Entitled to more respect is the 'risk-spreading'
argument, which maintains that the manufacturers, as a group and an industry, should absorb the
inevitable losses which must result in a complex civilization from the use of their products, be-
cause they are in the better position to do so, and through their prices to pass such losses on to
the community at large.").
27. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV.
772, 794 (1985) ("Rather than seeking to reduce the frequency and severity of such injuries,
secondary cost avoidance involves allocating injury costs so as to decrease the economic disloca-
tion caused by injuries. Spreading the impact of loss over time or among a class of individuals
will decrease economic dislocation, thereby reducing secondary costs.").
28. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980) ("The manufacturer
can spread the risk through insurance and price adjustments, whereas the injured individual
might suffer a crushing financial blow underwriting the loss himself."); James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 934 (1981) ("In
general, manufacturers are believed to be better able to obtain insurance than consumers, and
are assumed to be able to pass on most, if not all, of the insurance costs by raising the prices of
products.").
29. Third party or liability insurance pays the costs of tort claims, a large percentage of
which typically include pain and suffering; first party insurance, on the other hand, only reim-
burses accident victims for pecuniary losses. See George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer
Liability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237, 242-43 (1992) ("[F]irst-party insurance provides
no coverage whatsoever of pain and suffering loss, while pain and suffering comprises a signifi-
cant portion of tort law damages for almost all injuries.").
30. See Page Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966) ("The assumption is that the manufacturer can shift the loss to
the consumers by charging higher prices for products.").
31. See Plant, supra note 12, at 947 ("The point attempted to be made here is that it is not
sound thinking to assume, as a general basis for policy determination, that manufacturers are
always in an economic position to pass on to the public the risks arising from non-negligently
caused product defects.").
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pensation and private insurance. 32 Thus, consumers who purchase their own
insurance are required to pay for such protection a second time when they
buy products. 33 By the same token, employers who contribute to workers'
compensation programs must pay again for employees' injuries in the form of
higher prices for workplace supplies and equipment because the producers of
such products pass their liability costs on to their customers.34 Second, the
tort system does not distribute benefits fairly; some accident victims are
grossly overcompensated, while others receive little or nothing at all.
3 5
Third, excessive tort liability claims have driven some product sellers out of
business, thereby refuting the prevailing assumption that product sellers have
virtually unlimited resources to pay such claims. 36 Finally, products liability
has proven to be far more expensive to operate than other loss-spreading
systems. 37 On average, accident victims receive less than half of the money
that is paid out by producers to settle tort claims. 38 In contrast, the adminis-
trative costs associated with workers compensation, private health insurance,
and Social Security are much more reasonable.
39
32. See George L. Priest, The Continuing Crisis in Liability, 1 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 243, 248
(1988) ("Today, the compensation insurance provided by the legal system is largely redundant.
The workers filing 60 percent of products liability claims are already covered for disability losses
and full medical expenses through workers' compensation. Similarly, the vast majority of the
U.S. population possesses medical coverage, and a large number possesses general disability
coverage.").
33. See Owen, supra note 15, at 707 ("Nor may it be fair (or efficient) to penalize the
prudent consumer who insures himself through health and wage insurance plans by forcing him
to pay again through higher prices to overinsure himself and also to insure his less prudent
neighbors.").
34. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claims: An Answer to
Product Liability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL. L. REV.
435, 441 ("But now, in addition to paying workers' compensation benefits, the employer increas-
ingly pays the equivalent of common law liability reflected in increased costs of machinery or
indemnity agreements with his capital goods suppliers.").
35. See generally Sugarman, supra note 21, at 592-96 (discussing undercompensation and
overcompensation aspects of tort system).
36. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 329,
335-36 (1987) ("In fact, in some mass tort situations, the amounts of money sought and likely to
be awarded are so great as to threaten to exhaust both liability insurance and the underlying
capital of the defendant companies.").
37. See Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of
Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 642-
43 (1988) ("Administrative costs and attorney's fees absorb a large percentage of every dollar
awarded through the tort system.").
38. See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil
Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 492 (1987) ("[Olverall, plaintiffs appear to receive, in
net compensation, about fifty percent of tort litigation expenditures."); Robert L. Rabin, Some
Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 35 (1988) ("Reduced to a
single figure, injury victims were receiving slightly less than half of every dollar expended by the
system on accident claims.").
39. See Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths
and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 135 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991)
(" '[T]ransaction costs' consume 30 percent of the costs of the workers' compensation system, 15
percent of health insurance, and just 1 percent of the social security system.").
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C. Moral Principles
There is also a moral dimension to products liability.40 Thus, it has been
suggested that products liability rules should promote corrective justice, pro-
vide vindication for accident victims, and uphold community norms of con-
duct and rectitude.
Corrective justice in its traditional form requires those who wrongfully
acquire something of value from another to return their unjust gains. 4 1 By
extension, principles of corrective justice also can be invoked to justify the
payment of compensation when a wrongful act causes injury even though the
wrongdoer has not directly profited from a wrongful act.42 Arguably, this
principle of corrective justice is not limited to unjust enrichment situations,
but can be applied to personal injury cases as well. 43 Thus, forcing those who
profit from the sale of defective products to compensate accident victims can
also be said to further the principle of corrective justice.
Tort liability also may serve a vindicatory function.44 Lawsuits, it is said,
provide an opportunity for accident victims to tell their story in a public fo-
rum and to receive comfort and emotional support from the rest of the com-
munity. 45 In addition, damage awards may help victims of wrongdoing to
overcome their sense of indignation and outrage.46 Finally, tort actions are
thought to uphold community norms of conduct and rectitude by providing a
degree of public accountability for those who violate them.4 7 In this manner,
40. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 430 (1993) ("At bottom, product accidents are moral-
not technological-events. And so the law of products liability should turn to moral theory in
establishing its fundamental principles.").
41. See Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421,423
(1982) ("The principle of corrective justice requires annulments of both wrongful gains and
losses.").
42. See id. ("A compensable or undeserved loss need not, however, be the result of an-
other's wrongdoing. Sometimes the justifiable (i.e. nonwrongful) taking of what another has a
well-established right to justifies a claim to rectification.").
43. See Catherine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2351 (1990) ("A corrective justice justification for tort law
has a strong intuitive basis-if one party wrongfully injures another, our deepest intuitions seem
to argue that justice requires a remedy.").
44. See Smith, supra note 20, at 783-85 (discussing need to respond to "sense of injustice"
felt by accident victims).
45. See Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1177, 1218 (1990) ("This opportunity to speak and be heard about personal tragedy may be
the most important feature of tort for accident victims, more important in some ways than ob-
taining monetary compensation."); Joseph W. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861,
869 (1987) ("Damaged people want compensation; there is no denying that. They also want
accountability, which in a civilized society means access to a forum and a set of rules by which
they may publicly prove themselves right and someone else wrong.").
46. See Ingber, supra note 27, at 781 ("Compensation may restore the plaintiff's sense of
self-value, and erase his sense of outrage.").
47. See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39
WAYNE L. REv. 1217, 1226 (1993) ("This goal [of vindication] is achieved through compensating
the victim, the sense of retribution and rectification that attaches to that compensation and the
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moral values are strengthened when powerful violators, such as government
institutions or large corporations, are publicly called to account.
Unfortunately, products liability does not seem to be a very effective
mechanism for upholding moral principles. The corrective justice rationale
appears to be especially weak. First of all, the existence of a wrongful act,
which is a core concept of corrective justice, is largely ignored in products
liability litigation. The emphasis is on condition of the product, not the cul-
pability of the manufacturer.48 Second, personal connection between the vic-
tim and the wrongdoer, another important aspect of corrective justice, is
almost entirely absent from products liability litigation. Instead, when acci-
dent victims seek legal redress for their injuries, they seldom recover from
the actual wrongdoer, assuming that there is one, but instead are typically
compensated by a corporate defendant or its liability insurer.
49
There also are problems with the vindicatory rationale. In fact, few vic-
tims ever get to tell their story in court because the great majority of cases
never go to trial,50 and those who do pursue their claims aggressively often
experience delay and frustration rather than vindication. 51 It is rare indeed
for an accident victim to achieve complete vindication through the judicial
process.
Finally, products liability litigation seldom upholds any public notions of
morality. The liability rules are much too vague and uncertain for that. In-
stead, when cases go to trial, if the plaintiff wins, the verdict is more likely to
reflect the caprice of the jury than any conscious attempt to uphold commu-
nity standards of morality.
reallocation of loss that takes place."); Timothy T. Laden, Responsibility for Human Suffering:
Awareness, Participation, and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 504 (1993)
("Tort law not only remedies injustice by imposing damage awards, it also exposes normative
features of relations between parties by articulating and applying conceptions of
responsibility.").
48. See Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1983) ("Thus, the focus is upon
the nature of the product, and the consumer's reasonable expectations with regard to the prod-
uct, rather than on the conduct either of the manufacturer or of the person injured because of
the product."); Fops v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976) ("The relevant
inquiry in a strict liability action focuses not on the conduct of the manufacturer but rather on
the product itself."); Lionhearted v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984) (stating
that strict liability may be imposed only when product is unsafe beyond what reasonable con-
sumer would contemplate).
49. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 796
(1987) ("A victim today rarely can expect to recover directly from the individual who injured
him. Instead, he will recover from an insurance company or a large impersonal enterprise, such
as a corporation or a government entity.").
50. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 174 (1988) ("All but a tiny frac-
tion, less than 5 percent, of all successful tort claims terminate in a negotiated settlement rather
than a judicial adjudication."); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Study on Paths to a 'Better Way': Litigation,
Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 837 ("Of all cases filed in court, the large
majority-at least ninety percent-are settled without trial.").
51. See Sugarman, supra note 21, at 610 ("[T]he victim who sues often finds more aggrava-
tion than satisfaction or revenge.").
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D. Alternatives to Strict Liability in Tort
The above discussion suggests that the existing tort-based system of
products liability is seriously flawed and, perhaps, should be replaced by
something else. Indeed, commentators already have proposed various alter-
natives, such as neo-contractual arrangements,52 statutory compensation
schemes, 53 or comprehensive social insurance programs. 54 On the other
hand, these reformers generally have ignored contract law as a possible sub-
stitute for strict liability. Possibly they feel that contract law is too compli-
cated 55  or too insensitive to the needs of ordinary consumers.
56
Nevertheless, I believe that it is appropriate to give serious consideration to
the Uniform Commercial Code as a possible replacement for the existing
system of tort-based products liability.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AS AN INSURANCE MECHANISM
A number of legal scholars have suggested that products liability theory
acts in some respects like an insurance policy. 57 According to this view, a
consumer who purchases a product also buys insurance protection against
certain product-related injuries.58 The implicit assumption is that producers
can insure against product-related injuries (either by obtaining liability insur-
ance from commercial providers or by self-insuring) more cheaply than indi-
52. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 317, 322-28 (1987) (proposing that product sellers be immunized from tort claims if they
offer period payment of victims' net economic losses); Jeffrey O'Connell, An Immediate Solution
to Some Products Liability Problems: Workers' Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees,
with an Employer's Remedy Against Third Parties, 1976 INS. L.J. 683, 685-87 (proposing to limit
claims by injured workers to workers compensation benefits).
53. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-Related
Injuries, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 669, 692-710 (1997) (proposing statutory scheme based on first-
party insurance model).
54. See Sugarman, supra note 21, at 642-51 (proposing that tort law be replaced by ex-
panded social programs to pay disability and medical expenses for accident victims).
55. See Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) ("The remedies of in-
jured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales.").
56. See Morris G. Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The Judicial Adoption of Strict
Tort Products Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. REV. 697, 707 (1978) ("Indeed, a great deal of the
motivation for strict tort seems based on the assumption that strict tort gives consumers a better
break, i.e., better justice than would be true under the UCC.").
57. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
75, 88 (1993) ("Tort liability is also a forced-insurance arrangement, under which potential vic-
tims are required to insure themselves against the risk of suffering injury from the sale of a
product."); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
645, 668 (1985) ("The current doctrines of products liability law can be understood as a form of
mandatory insurance that is tied to the sale of an automobile [or other product]."); see also
Owen, supra note 40, at 487 ("[M]anufacturers today provide a form of unscheduled third-party
insurance through the products liability system.").
58. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353, 362 (1988) ("An element of the price thus is an insurance premium, whose size
ideally varies with the amount of 'coverage' against loss that consumers demand.").
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vidual consumers. 59 Thus, even though consumers ultimately pay for
insurance coverage in the form of higher product prices, they indirectly bene-
fit by obtaining this insurance protection at lower cost. In addition, products
liability extends insurance coverage to less fortunate members of society who
might not otherwise be able to insure themselves against product-related
injury.
60
There are a number of techniques that insurance companies typically
employ to control risk and maintain stable prices for insurance services. For
example, insurers attempt to make the risks they insure against more predict-
able by relying upon a strategy of diversification. 6 1 This involves pooling
together a large number of insureds so that unexpected losses will be offset
by unexpected gains. 62 Insurers also try to segregate insureds into separate,
narrowly-defined risk pools for purposes of calculating premiums. 63 This
helps to control the problem of adverse selection 64 and thereby makes insur-
ance more attractive to low-risk purchasers.65 Finally, insurers impose de-
ductible and co-payment requirements in order to reduce the problem of
moral hazard.
66
However, the present system of strict liability prevents insurers or prod-
uct sellers from using these risk-control tools effectively. First of all, some of
the risks that product sellers are subjected to, such as unexpected increases in
59. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1535 (1987) ("A provider, especially a corporate provider, is in a substantially better posi-
tion than a consumer to obtain insurance for product- or service-related losses, because a pro-
vider can either self-insure or can enter one insurance contract covering all consumers-in
comparison to the thousands of insurance contracts the set of consumers would need-and can
easily pass the proportionate insurance premium along in the product or service price.").
60. See id. ("More importantly, to tie insurance to the sale of the product or service will
provide insurance coverage to consumers who might not otherwise obtain first-party coverage, in
particular the poor or low-income among the consuming population.").
61. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 926-27 (1989).
62. See id.
63. See Priest, supra note 59, at 1545.
64. Adverse selection occurs when high-risk individuals are allowed to participate in the
same risk pool as low-risk individuals. See ROBERT C. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE
LAw 14 (Student ed. 1988).
65. See Priest, supra note 59, at 1543. According to Professor Priest, the premium for the
entire pool must be set according to the average level of risk in the pool. See id. at 1541. If there
is a wide range between high-risk and low-risk members of the pool, a premium, based on aver-
age risk, will be so high as to cause low-risk individuals to leave the pool. At the same time, the
premium will be low enough to encourage more high-risk individuals to enter the pool. See Jon
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification
for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 140 (1990).
66. See id. at 142 (stating that insurers often implement copayment features to limit risk-
pool inefficiencies). The term "moral hazard" refers to the tendency of some insureds to fail to
take adequate precautions against injury, to make fraudulent claims against insurers, or to in-
crease their consumption of health services. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role
of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 525 (1984).
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liability exposure due to changes in liability rules, are not uncorrelated 67 and,
therefore, cannot be controlled, like ordinary risks, by diversification. 68 Fur-
thermore, under the current liability system each potential victim pays the
same premium, regardless of risk, even though such flat-rate premiums en-
courage adverse selection and drive away low-risk consumers. 69 Finally, the
present approach exacerbates moral hazard problems because producers are
required under existing tort damage rules to pay accident victims full com-
pensation for their injuries.
Arguably, a contract-based approach would be more efficient as an in-
surance mechanism than the present tort-based system of products liability.
For example, under a tort law regime, liability and compensation issues are
determined by someone other than the parties themselves; in contrast, under
a contract-based approach, liability and compensation issues can be agreed
upon ex ante by the parties themselves through the use of express warranties,
disclaimers, and limitations of remedy. This would allow producers (insur-
ers) to limit their exposure to unexpected risks.
Adverse selection also can be dealt with much better under a contract-
based approach. For example, sellers can distinguish between casual users
and professional users by charging professional users more for their warranty
protection. This would place professional users, who tend to have higher us-
age rates and correspondingly higher injury rates, in a different risk category
than buyers who use the product less frequently. Sellers also could exclude
specific types of high-risk product uses (or misuses) from warranty/insurance
coverage or could limit their liability for injuries resulting from such uses. In
addition, sellers could impose time limits on warranty protection, thereby ex-
cluding injuries to consumers who continue to use a product beyond its useful
life. These measures would shift more of the insurance cost to high risk buy-
ers; on the other hand, sellers could keep lower-risk buyers in the risk pool
by insuring them at considerably lower cost.
A contract-based approach also would allow sellers to cope more effec-
tively with moral hazard problems. For example, sellers could restrict war-
ranty coverage to specific types of losses or sellers could pay claims on a
scheduled basis as is done under workers' compensation. Another alterna-
tive would be to limit liability to a specific percentage of the loss suffered
instead of paying for all of it. This technique would operate much like co-
payments in first-party insurance contracts.
67. An uncorrelated risk is one which is random or statistically independent. This means
that the likelihood of one event occurring is not increased or decreased by the occurrence of
some other event. See Priest, supra note 59, at 1540.
68. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 61, at 927 ("Non-random fluctuation, however, cannot
be diversified away, and the possibility that the tort system will convulsively increase available
damages is not a random risk.").
69. See Priest, supra note 13, at 500 ("If the disparity between the premium and the risks
added by low-risk members becomes too substantial, low-risk members are likely to drop out of
the pool because they find alternative means of protection cheaper than market insurance.").
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Finally, a contract-based approach would avoid the problem of overin-
surance. It has been suggested that compensation levels should not exceed
the amount of insurance protection consumers are willing to pay for.70 How-
ever, because consumers' insurance needs vary, tort law damage rules often
force consumers to purchase excessive amounts of insurance.71 A sales-
based approach avoids the problem of overinsurance because insurance (or
warranty) coverage can be tailored to fit the needs of individual buyers. For
example, consumers who do not have sufficient medical, life, or disability
insurance might want to obtain full warranty coverage, while those with ade-
quate first-party insurance could purchase less warranty protection or none
at all. Similarly, consumers who do not wish to insure against nonpecuniary
losses, such as pain and suffering, could select a warranty that excluded con-
sequential damages. 72 The point is that a wide variety of consumer tastes can
be accommodated if sellers are allowed to provide variable warranty
coverage.
III. BASIC FEATURES OF A CONTRACT-BASED LIABILITY REGIME
Arguably, a contract-based products liability regime is preferable to a
tort-based approach because it gives the parties more freedom to allocate
product-related risks. Moreover, there is no need to develop a contract-
based liability system from scratch; the Uniform Commercial Code's system
of warranties and remedies, with only slight changes, will work quite well.
However, my argument for a contract-based products liability system as-
sumes that sellers will offer reasonable choices with respect to risk allocation.
It also assumes that consumers will act rationally when they purchase war-
ranty/insurance protection from sellers.
A. The Argument for a Contract-Based Liability Regime
There are several advantages to allowing buyers and sellers to allocate
risk by private agreement instead of leaving such decisions to courts and ju-
ries. First of all, private decisionmaking fosters autonomy and personal free-
dom. 73 Assuming that buyers have access to relevant information and are
not subjected to economic coercion, there is no reason to prevent them from
70. See Danzon, supra note 66, at 520 ("The optimal compensatory award is the amount of
insurance the victim would have purchased voluntarily, at the price implied by the load of the
defendant's liability insurance."); Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the King-
dom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 100
(1993) ("[I]nsurance theorists posit that the optimal compensatory sum is the amount of insur-
ance that individuals would have purchased in an actuarially fair insurance market.").
71. See Priest, supra note 59, at 1552 ("In comparison to first-party insurance, third-party
tort law insurance provides coverage in excessive amounts .... ").
72. See Schwartz, supra note 58, at 362-66 (explaining that it is not economically efficient to
insure against nonpecuniary losses because they do not affect marginal utility of money).
73. See Pierce, supra note 22, at 1283 ("Since values are highly individualized, the choice of
purchasing more or less safety is to a significant extent linked to the individual freedom so highly
regarded by American society.").
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making their own decisions about product-related risks. A contract-based
system of products liability allows them to do so, while the existing approach
perpetuates the paternalistic values of an earlier time.
Private decisionmaking also promotes economic efficiency. There are
many situations where buyers can deal with risk more cheaply than sellers.74
For example, for some buyers, the risk of injury might be much lower than
average. For these buyers, it might make sense to forego additional warranty
protection. In addition, buyers may be able to insure against risk more
cheaply than sellers, or they may simply have enough insurance already. In
any event, significant utility gains can be achieved if such buyers are permit-
ted to purchase exactly the type of warranty/insurance coverage they
desire.
75
B. Consumer Protection Under the Uniform Commercial Code
When a defective product causes economic or physical harm, the buyer
may maintain an action for breach of warranty in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code. 7 6 Express warranties
may arise under the Code as the result of express representations about the
physical attributes or quality of a product.77 In addition, the Code recognizes
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose which may
be implied by law. 78 Furthermore, the Code provides injured parties with a
wide variety of remedies when either express or implied warranties are
breached.
79
74. See Mark A. Kaprelian, Note, Privity Revisited: Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer
for a Defective Product's Self-Inflicted Damage, 84 MICH. L. REV. 517, 538 (1985) ("It seems
likely that there will be at least some product risks that the buyer, rather than the seller, will be
able to avoid more cheaply or insure against more readily.").
75. See Lindley J. Brenza, Comment, Asbestos in Schools and the Economic Loss Doctrine,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 277, 291 (1987) ("For example, a buyer who already has insurance for bodily
injury may not want duplicative coverage; such a buyer would prefer to accept this risk rather
than pay a higher price that included some insurance component.").
76. See, e.g., William R. Clement, Jr., Note, Strict Liability and Warranty in Consumer Pro-
tection: The Broader Protection of the UCC in Cases Involving Economic Loss, Used Goods, and
Nondangerous Defective Goods, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1354 (1982) (stating that UCC
permits recovery for economic losses sustained as result of defective product in breach of war-
ranty action); John E. Lynch, Jr., Note, Recovery of Direct Economic Loss: The Unanswered
Questions of Ohio Products Liability Law, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 683, 718 (1977) (explaining
that actions for breach of warranty are controlled by article two of UCC).
77. See Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1171-72 (1987).
78. An implied warranty may also arise from trade usage or course of dealing. See Richard
A. Lord, Some Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied Warranties, 56 N.D. L. REV.
509, 572-73 (1980) (arguing that warranties arising from trade usage or course of dealing are
separate and distinct from other implied warranties).
79. See generally Special Project, supra note 77, at 1220-1257 (explaining remedies available
for action based on breach of warranty).
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1. Express Warranties
Under section 2-313, an express warranty may arise in various ways. For
example, an affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods sold may be
treated as a warranty that the goods will conform to the affirmation or prom-
ise.80 Courts have held affirmations or promises in advertisements,8 1 pam-
phlets and brochures, 82 sales contracts,8 3 and owner's manuals 84 all to be
express warranties. However, express warranties do not necessarily have to
be in writing; in some cases, oral representations by sellers have been treated
as express warranties.
85
Express warranties also may be created by description.86 The seller may
declare that the goods shall conform to a particular description given in the
sales contract. 87 Any deviation from the description provided may constitute
a breach of warranty.8 8 Finally, an express warranty may be created by sam-
80. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1)(a) (1997). This provision declares that: "Any affirmation of fact or
promise may by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise." Id.
81. See Scheuler v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 571 P.2d 48, 51 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (adver-
tising by transmission repair franchisor held to create express warranty); Pake v. Byrd, 286
S.E.2d 588, 589 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (finding statement in newspaper advertisement that used
tractor was in "good condition" constituted express warranty).
82. See Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d 1126, 1131 (Ala. 1992) (holding that
statement in seller's brochure that copper piping could withstand up to 250 degrees water tem-
perature amounted to express warranty); Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71
(Idaho 1983) (finding that promotional material and pamphlets given to customer by mobile
home dealer gave rise to express warranty); Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hester, 550 A.2d 389, 396-97
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (concluding that newsletters and other promotional material given to
buyer which extolled seaworthiness of seller's yachts constituted express warranty).
83. See Colorado-Ute Electric Ass'n v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Colo.
1981) (finding representations by seller in sales contract about performance characteristics of air
pollution control equipment to be express warranty).
84. See Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 416 A.2d 394, 397 (N.J. 1980) (stating that
representations in automobile tire owner's manual constituted express warranty).
85. See Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that oral
statement by seller that horse was registered created express warranty); Miller v. Hubbard-Wray
Co., 630 P.2d 880. 882 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (ruling that seller's oral representations about age of
used hay baler constituted express warranty).
86. See Lord, supra note 78, at 516 (stating that express warranty is created any time de-
scription of goods is involved in sale). These types of warranties were treated as implied warran-
ties under the Uniform Sales Act. See Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77
HARV. L. REV. 318, 319 (1963) (explaining that warranty relating to description is treated as
implied under Uniform Sales Act, but express under UCC).
87. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1)(b) (1997). This provision provides that: "Any description of the
goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description." Id.
88. See Agricultural Servs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1064 (6th
Cir. 1977) (concluding that breach of express warranty occurred when seed package labeled as
"C/S okra seed" contained another variety).
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pie or model.8 9 Thus, if a sample 90 or model 9l is provided by the seller to the
buyer, this also may constitute a warranty that the goods sold will conform to
it. A sample is an item that is drawn from the bulk of the goods, while a
model is a representation of what the goods are supposed to look like.
9 2
Some states require that consumers specifically rely on the seller's repre-
sentations of product quality in order to recover damages for breach of ex-
press warranty. 93 Of course, this requirement, if strictly enforced, would
invalidate many express warranty claims because consumers seldom read
warranty information before purchasing a product. However, the Uniform
Commercial Code merely requires that the seller's promises or representa-
tions become "part of the basis of the bargain."' 94 Many courts have con-




Warranties also may be implied by law, regardless of the intent of the
parties. The implied warranty of merchantability is an example of such a
warranty.96 The implied warranty of merchantability is applicable to used as
well as new goods. 97 This warranty will arise only if the seller is a "merchant
89. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1)(c) (1997). This provision provides that: "Any sample or model
which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model." Id.
90. See Glyptal Inc. v. Engelhard Corp., 801 F. Supp. 887, 895-96 (D. Mass. 1992) (ruling
that sample of cadmium paint created express warranty); AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc.,
501 F. Supp. 224, 228 (N.D. Il. 1980) (holding that samples of liquor bottle cap liners provided
by seller created express warranty).
91. See Barton v. Tra-Mo, Inc., 686 P.2d 423, 426 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
preproduction versions of plastic auxiliary fuel tanks could be considered models); Pacific
Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Corp., 525 P.2d 615, 618-19 (Utah 1974) (concluding
that piece of molded acrylic material constituted model for purposes of express warranty).
92. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 6 (1997).
93. See Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985)
("Since an express warranty must have been 'made part of the basis of the bargain,' it is essential
that the plaintiff proves reliance upon the warranty."); see also Ainger v. Michigan General
Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("The question of whether the promisee 'relied'
on the warranty, then, is whether he believed he was purchasing the promise."), aff'd, 632 F.2d
1025 (2d Cir. 1980).
94. John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN.
L. REV. 283, 284 (1982).
95. See Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259, 1261 (Ala. 1983) ("In fact, it is not
necessary to show any particular reliance by the buyer to give rise to such warranties."); Jensen
v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983) ("[t]he buyer of goods need not
rely on an 'affirmation of fact or promise' or 'description' for the same to become 'part of the
basis of the bargain' and hence an express warranty.").
96. See William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MIN. L.
REV. 117, 124 (1943) ("The warranty [of merchantability] is imposed by the law. It is read into
the contract by the law without regard to whether the parties intended it in fact; it arises merely
because the goods have been sold at all.").
97. See Dickerson v. Mountain View Equip. Co., 710 P.2d 621, 625 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
("We hold that the implied warranty of merchantability ... applies to transactions of both new
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
with respect to goods of that kind."' 98 However, the mere fact that the seller
can be classified as a merchant for some purposes will not automatically
cause him to be classified as a merchant for purposes of creating an implied
warranty of merchantability. 99
The Code does not define merchantability, but instead establishes cer-
tain requirements which must be met if goods are to be considered merchant-
able.1°° To be merchantable, goods must be capable of passing without
objection in the trade under the contract description. 101 If the goods are
fungible, they must be of fair average quality within the contract descrip-
tion.'0 2 In addition, merchantable goods must be of even kind, quality, and
quantity within each unit and among all units. Goods also must be ade-
quately contained, packaged, and labeled. 10 3 Furthermore, the goods must
and used goods."); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 292 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ill. App. Ct.
1972) ("Defects which have been held to make operation of a new automobile unfit and thereby
cause a breach of implied warranties may result in the breach of the same warranties on a used
automobile."); Beck Enters., Inc. v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 672, 676 (Miss. 1987) ("This Court con-
cludes the UCC does not distinguish between new and used 'goods' and that the implied war-
ranty of merchantability applies to the sale of a used motor vehicle by a 'merchant with respect
to goods of that kind.'").
98. Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, supra note 77, at 1192. The Code
defines a merchant as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill." U.C.C. § 2-104 (1) (1997).
99. See Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan, 329 So. 2d 92, 95 (Ala. 1976) (concluding that
bank that sold defective boat to plaintiff was not a merchant with respect to boats).
100. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2) (1997). This provision provides:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.
Id.
101. See Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1071
(Mass. 1985) (concluding that wine contaminated with "Fresno mold" would not pass without
objection in trade); Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 190 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1971) (finding that only steel with carbon content between 1010 and 1020 would be consid-
ered "commercial quality" steel according to custom and usage within steel business). But see
Ford v. Starr Fireworks, Inc., 874 P.2d 230, 234 (Wyo. 1994) (stating fireworks passed without
objection in the trade because other retailers were willing to purchase the goods in question
from original buyer).
102. See Tracor, Inc. v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co., 484 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972) (declining to uphold buyer's breach of warranty claim when sheetrock delivered by seller
was of average quality, though of different type than buyer expected to receive).
103. See Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 318 A.2d 874, 885-86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974), affd
sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 A.2d 1, 10-11 (Md. 1975)
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conform to any promises or affirmations of fact set forth on the container or
label. 10 4 Finally, to be merchantable, the goods must be fit for the ordinary
purposes for which they are sold. 10 5 However, this does not mean that the
goods are perfect,' 0 6 nor does it mean that the goods are necessarily fit for all
purposes.'
0 7
An implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose ensures that a
product will be suitable for any use that is peculiar to the buyer's special
business needs. 10 8 For an implied warranty of fitness to arise, the seller must
be aware of the particular purpose for which the goods are required and real-
ize that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or fur-
nish suitable goods. 10 9
(finding that exploding soft drink bottle breached seller's implied warranty of merchantability);
Gillispie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 187 S.E.2d 441, 443 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) (conclud-
ing that defective soft drink bottle was covered by implied warranty of merchantability because
it was inadequate container); Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. 1968) (finding that
cattle feed was unmerchantable because contents were not properly labeled).
104. See Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 385 (Cal. 1975) (stating "Golfing Gizmo" training
equipment was unmerchantable because it did not conform to safety promises on carton).
105. See Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024, 1026-27 (Miss.
1982) (upholding jury determination that new car with oil leaks, malfunctioning air conditioner,
and peeling vinyl top was not fit for ordinary purposes); Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg. Co., 340
N.W.2d 369, 376 (Neb. 1983) (finding that haystacking machine that consumed itself in flames
after half-day of use not suitable for ordinary use); Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d
528, 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (concluding that motor home with serious plumbing leaks was
not fit for ordinary purposes).
106. See Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) ("Of
course, an implied warranty of merchantable quality.., does not require a perfect product, only
one of reasonable quality or fitness."); Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 296 A.2d 269, 272 (Vt. 1972)
("Merchantability of even a new car ... imported no more than it be reasonably suited for
ordinary use. It does not mean that it be a car perfect in every detail, but only reasonably fit for
the ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet.").
107. See Prosser, supra note 96, at 133 ("Goods may be merchantable and still be unfit for
some unusual use intended; they may even be unmerchantable and still fit, as where stale bread
is sold for chicken feed.").
108. U.C.C § 2-315 (1997). This provision provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purposes.
Id.
109. Compare ITT Corp. v. LTX Corp., 732 F. Supp 1225, 1238 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding
that seller of cable assemblies was aware of buyer's particular uses for goods and that buyer had
relied on seller to modify cable assemblies for such uses), with Jones v. Marcus, 457 S.E.2d 271,
272-73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that no fitness warranty arose from sale of retreaded tires
when seller was not aware that buyer intended to use vehicle for business purposes), and Berg-
quist v. Mackay Engines, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (holding that there
was no implied warranty of fitness with respect to automobile engine when buyer did not inform
seller that he intended to install it in race car).
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3. Buyers' Remedies for Breach of Warranty
Various types of damages may be recovered under the Code for breach
of warranty. The basic measure of damages is the difference between the
value of the goods as accepted and their value as warranted.' 10 However, the
Code also permits a buyer to recover incidental"' and consequential dam-
ages. 112 Incidental damages include such things as the cost of transporting or
storing nonconforming or defective goods. 113 Consequential damages in-
clude physical injuries1 14 and property damage1 15 caused by defective
products.
C. Assumptions
The argument for replacing strict liability with a contract-based alterna-
tive is greatly strengthened if one makes certain assumptions about the mar-
ket environment in which buyers and sellers would operate. The first
assumption is that buyers and sellers will rely primarily on express warranties
rather than implied warranties to determine product quality and warranty
protection. The second assumption is that competitive pressures will force
110. U.C.C. § 2-714 (2) (1997). This provision provides that: "The measure of damages for
breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount." Id.
111. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1) (1997). This provision declares that: "Incidental damages resulting
from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transporta-
tion and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach." Id.
112. U.C.C. § 2-715 (2) (1997). This provision declares that:
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
Id.
113. See S & R Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 859 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing
buyer to recover transportation and storage costs of defective steel as incidental damages
notwithstanding provision in sales contract limiting "consequential" damages); Western Confer-
ence Resorts, Inc. v. Pease, 668 P.2d 973, 977 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing buyer to recover
storage and maintenance costs of defective airplane as incidental damages); Duff v. Bonner
Bldg. Supply, Inc., 649 P.2d 391, 395 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that buyer could recover cost
of removing and replacing defective paneling as incidental damages).
114. See Di Prospero v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (concluding that personal injuries suffered by car buyer should be treated as consequential
damages); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 266 S.E.2d 409, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that
personal injuries caused by exploding flashcube were recoverable as consequential damages).
115. See Fire Supply & Servs., Inc. v. Chico Hot Springs, 639 P. 2d 1160, 1165 (Mont. 1982)
(upholding lower court award of consequential damages to hotel for fire damage to premises);
Doty v. Parkway Homes Co., 368 S.E.2d 670, 671 (S.C. 1988) (allowing plaintiff to recover value
of contents of mobile home destroyed by fire); Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 623 P.2d 710, 715
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that damage to contents of mobile home resulting from leaks
were compensable as consequential damages).
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sellers to offer buyers a wide range of choices with respect to warranty/insur-
ance coverage.
1. The Primacy of Express Warranty
Commentators traditionally have thought of implied warranty of
merchantability as the Code's principal mechanism for protecting the rights
of ordinary consumers. 116 Consequently, we might reasonably expect a con-
tract-based products liability regime to rely heavily on the merchantability
warranty. Under such an approach, the basic requirements of product qual-
ity and safety would be determined by the standard of merchantability. Priv-
ity and notice requirements would be relaxed or abandoned so that
consumers could sue the manufacturers directly for breach of warranty and
disclaimers would be barred in personal injury cases.
Unfortunately, a regime of this sort would be nothing more than tort law
under another name. The substantive product quality standard required to
meet the implied warranty of merchantability would be virtually identical to
the standard imposed by tort law.117 Consequently, if sellers were unable to
disclaim the merchantability warranty, the resulting liability system would be
very similar to the discredited strict liability approach discussed above. For
this reason, it is better to eschew the implied warranty route and focus in-
stead on a liability regime based principally on express warranty.
The advantage of an express warranty, when coupled with limitations
and partial disclaimers, is that it allows the seller to define its insurance obli-
gation very precisely. For example, under this approach, a seller could spec-
ify the performance characteristics of the product, indicate how long the
product could be used safely, identify both proper and improper uses of the
product, and specify the extent of its liability for any injuries that might oc-
cur. This would enable sellers to insulate themselves against unexpected
changes in liability rules and it also would permit them to deal with adverse
selection problems. Of course, sellers would be free to offer very broad war-
ranty protection, even broader than that provided by the implied warranty of
merchantability, if they desired to do so. Moreover, if sellers were concerned
about moral hazard issues, they could contract to pay claims on a scheduled
basis or they could agree to pay only a certain percentage of the victim's out-
of-pocket expenses. Finally, the parties could reduce litigation costs by pro-
116. See Reed Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section
402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439, 442 (1969) ("Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
the consumer depends mainly on the warranty of merchantability.").
117. See Donald J. Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between
the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RurGERS L. REV. 692, 700 (1965)
("It appears, then, that the criterion for establishing that an article is 'defective' for purposes of
strict liability in tort is synonymous with the fitness criterion of merchantability set forth in sec-
tion 2-314 (2)(c)."); Morris G. Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser's Products Liability Cross-
word Game, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 550, 556 (1979) ("Almost every commentator who has
seriously studied the problem has concluded that there is no difference; that strict tort liability




viding for alternative methods of dispute resolution or by relaxing proof re-
quirements for certain issues.
I believe that consumers as well as sellers would benefit from this ap-
proach. Although they could not bargain face-to-face with sellers, consumers
would be able to choose among various levels of insurance protection, just as
they do when they purchase conventional first-party insurance. Presumably,
warranty coverage would vary from seller to seller, but even if it did not,
market pressure would induce most vendors to offer more than one kind of
protection. Consequently, consumers would be able to select the type of
warranty/insurance protection that best suited their needs.
2. Consumer Bargaining Power
The traditional view of buyer-seller relations assumed that sellers invari-
ably had the advantage. 118 Studies of consumer conduct in the marketplace
focused on how consumers behaved as individuals. These studies showed
that most consumers were not very well-informed about product safety1 19
and that they tended to underestimate low-probability risks.120 Furthermore,
even when consumers were fully aware of product-related risks, they seldom
had sufficient bargaining power to overcome the reluctance of product sellers
to provide meaningful protection against the risk of personal injury or prop-
erty damage.12
1
However, this notion of consumer ignorance and economic weakness
may have to be revised in light of new research and changing circumstances.
For example, some commentators believe that consumers can make knowl-
edgeable choices about the products they buy even though they do not know
118. See Dickerson, supra note 116, at 440 ("The key idea, then, is consumer vulnerability
to an unknown risk that is largely controllable by a sophisticated and well-heeled professional.");
Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318, 328 (1963) ("In effect,
the ordinary contracts of sale are contracts of adhesion, presented to consumers under condi-
tions of haste, ignorance, and compulsion.") (citation omitted).
119. See Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in De-
fective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 1008 (1966) ("It seems totally unrealistic to presup-
pose that a casual buyer is ever in a position to assess risks as perceptively as the party who is
trying to unload them through the disclaimer.").
120. See Howard A. Latin, Symposium: Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort The-
ory: Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677, 687 (1985)
("Because any risk assessment makes demands on time, money, and psychological resources,
people often do not consider low-frequency hazards even when catastrophic losses would occur
if the risks materialize."); Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Exam-
ples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 37, 65 (1986) ("[O]rdinary peo-
ple, operating under a variety of psychological limitations, may be likely to do a particularly bad
job in making decisions about very low probability catastrophes.").
121. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1119 ("Undoubtedly the practice exists [of offering war-
ranty protection] on a large scale; but it is limited, on the part of almost every one, to replace-
ment, repair, or return of the purchase price to make good the original bargain; and it does not
extend to compensation for injuries to the person of the buyer, or his other property.").
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much about them.122 According to these theorists, the better the product is,
the better the warranty is likely to be because the cost of such warranties to
producers will be low if the products do not break down. 123 Manufacturers
of high-quality products have an incentive to signal this fact to consumers by
means of better warranties.' 2 4 Therefore, consumers can treat warranties as
signals about product quality and safety and do not have to actually investi-
gate products in order to choose the best ones.
125
Furthermore, although individual consumers do not have much clout
with producers, collective behavior in consumer markets does make a differ-
ence. This suggests that consumers as a group can obtain better warranty
protection if they want it.l2 6 Although consumers cannot bargain individu-
ally with producers for greater warranty protection, they can shop around for
the best deal. Moreover, if enough consumers shop around, nonshoppers will
be able to obtain the same terms because producers respond to markets, not
to individuals. 127 Thus, arguably consumer preferences can play an impor-
tant role in determining product quality and the level of warranty protection
that sellers provide.
Of course, there is always a risk that producers will take advantage of a
contract-based regime to strip consumers of existing warranty protection
without giving them anything in return. For example, producers might refuse
to compete in the area of insurance/warranty protection and, instead, con-
spire to offer only highly-restrictive warranties as the automobile industry did
in the 1950s.128 Another concern is that consumers, when given a choice,
might refuse to pay for warranty protection even when they need it. If either
of these happen on a large scale, the approach proposed above could be a
122. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1396-97 (1983)
(analyzing signalling theory of warranties, which holds that consumers utilize warranties to as-
sess overall product quality).
123. See id. (finding warranty costs to manufacturers vary inversely with product quality,
and low quality manufacturers will be unable to make "strong" warranties because of high cost
of replacement).
124. See id. at 1397 ("Firms with products whose quality is better than the low expectation
consumers start with have an incentive to signal this better quality.... [T]hey can best do this by
making 'strong' warranties.").
125. See Priest, supra note 19, at 1303 ("Thus, although a consumer has neither experience
with nor knowledge of a product, he may infer its mechanical reliability by inspecting the terms
of the warranty alone.").
126. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 122, at 1414 ("[W]hen consumers prefer warranties,
markets frequently will supply just the warranty coverage they desire.").
127. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979) ("Thus, if
enough searchers exist, firms have incentives both to compete for their business and to offer the
same terms to nonsearchers.").
128. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 87 (N.J. 1960) (finding inade-




disaster for many consumers. However, I am relatively optimistic that
neither of these scenarios will occur.
As mentioned earlier, recent studies indicate that producers are willing
to compete for business by offering more comprehensive warranty protec-
tion. This is to be expected in a market environment that is much less mono-
lithic than it was forty or fifty years ago. In many industries, the entry of
foreign competitors has forced American firms to abandon the monopolistic
practices of an earlier period. 129 For this reason, it would be very difficult for
an entire industry to exculpate itself by using standardized disclaimers unless
it made significant price concessions. Even if most firms within an industry
wished to limit their liability, one maverick company could thwart these ef-
forts by offering better warranty terms. Once this happened, other firms
would be forced to follow suit in order to preserve their existing market
shares.
130
Another concern is that consumers will not make utility-maximizing de-
cisions if they are given the opportunity to choose among various levels of
warranty/insurance protection. Ideally, those who are fully insured will de-
cline additional warranty/insurance protection, while those who are not in-
sured will seek greater protection. Unfortunately, some of the uninsured
may refuse to purchase insurance from product sellers. When this happens,
uninsured accident victims and their families will either have to bear these
losses unaided or their losses will be shifted to the public in the form of wel-
fare or medicaid assistance.
These problems do not arise under the existing system of products liabil-
ity because consumers are forced to obtain a certain level of protection
against product-related injury whether they need it or not. The issue, there-
fore, is whether we should retain a paternalistic, but arguably inefficient sys-
tem, in order to protect against the consequences of bad judgment on the
part of some consumers, or whether we should adopt a more efficient ap-
proach and accept the fact that some consumers will fare less well under it. I
believe that the second choice is the better one. The efficiency gains that will
result from a contract-based system of products liability should greatly out-
weigh the costs that will be imposed on consumers who fail to purchase ade-
quate insurance protection against product-related injuries.
IV. PROBLEM AREAS
In its present form, the Uniform Commercial Code contains a number of
provisions that might unduly limit the scope of Article Two warranties.
These include privity requirements, notice requirements, disclaimers, limita-
129. For example, the automobile industry now competes extensively in the area of non-
personal-injury warranty protection. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 127, at 667 (finding that
market correction was more effective than state regulation would have been in increasing auto-
mobile warranty protections).
130. I assume that these same competitive pressures would prevent firms from reducing the.
current level of protection without also reducing product prices.
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tions on remedies, and statutes of limitation. Arguably, these provisions, at
least in their present form undercut the Code's usefulness as a foundation for
contract-based system of products liability.
A. The Privity Requirement
Privity of contract refers to the relationship between contracting parties.
Those who have entered into a contract with one another are in privity; those
who have not contracted directly with one another are not in privity.131
Commentators have identified two types of privity: vertical and horizontal.
Vertical privity governs the liability of parties in the marketing chain; only
parties who have contracted directly with one another are in vertical priv-
ity. 132 Thus, if vertical privity is required, only the immediate buyer can re-
cover against a seller.133 Horizontal privity describes the relationship
between the seller and the ultimate user; if horizontal privity is required, the
seller will be liable only to the buyer and not to others who may use or con-
sume the product.
134
The drafters of the Code made no changes in the common-law require-
ments with respect to vertical privity. 135 Consequently, each state is free to
adopt its own vertical privity rules. Although some states have abolished the
vertical privity requirement entirely, 136 many continue to require vertical
privity when the retail buyer has merely suffered an economic injury.137 In
131. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 389-91
(4th ed. 1995) (describing both kinds of privity and discussing relaxation of privity in section 2-
318 of UCC); Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, supra note 77, at
1310-11 (describing horizontal and vertical privity and noting its slow demise in warranty law).
132. See Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, supra note 77, at
1310-11 (finding that typically manufacturer is only in privity with wholesaler and buyer is only
in privity with retailer).
133. See Edward H. Rabin & Jill Herman Grossman, Defective Products or Realty Causing
Economic Loss: Toward a Unified Theory of Recovery, 12 Sw. U. L. REv. 4, 15 (1981) (examin-
ing three alternatives of UCC section 2-318 and how they utilize vertical privity requirements).
134. See generally Elizabeth A. Heiner, Note, Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford
& Risberg, Inc.: What Recovery for Economic Loss-Tort or Contract?, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1337,
1342-43 (explaining difference between vertical and horizontal non-privity plaintiffs).
135. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment. 3 provides:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, house-
hold, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not in-
tended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties,
given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
136. These states include Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia. See ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West
1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-318 (1994); see also WHE & SUMMERS, supra note 131,
at 393 n.8 (stating that Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia enacted expansive
provisions that abolish vertical privity requirement).
137. See Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 444, 454 (D. Vt. 1993) (holding
that vertical privity was required in order to sue lacrosse manufacturer for economic damages);
Rhodes v. General Motors Corp., 621 So. 2d 945, 947 (Ala. 1993) (refusing to impose liability
upon automobile manufacturer in absence of vertical privity); Szajua v. General Motors Corp.,
503 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ill. 1986) (requiring vertical privity in order to bring claim, based on breach
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personal injury cases, however, an increasing number of courts allow implied
warranty claims to be brought against remote sellers even if there is no verti-
cal privity.138 The same principle has been extended to property damage
cases as well.
139
The drafters of the Code addressed the issue of horizontal privity in sec-
tion 2-318, entitled "third party beneficiaries of warranties express or im-
plied." In its original form, now known as Alternative A, section 2-318
declared that express and implied warranties would extend not only to the
buyer, but also to family members and household guests of the buyer when it
was reasonable to assume that they would use, consume or be affected by the
goods.140 Twenty-eight states, as well as the District of Columbia, have
of implied warranty, against automobile manufacturer); Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris
Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 891 (Kan. 1984) (holding that implied warranty claim could not be
brought against computer manufacturer when vertical privity did not exist between defendant
and claimant). But see Israel Phoenix Assur. Co. v. SMS Sutton, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 102, 103-05
(W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that vertical privity was not required to sue manufacturer of hydraulic
press cylinder for breach of implied warranty); Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F.
Supp. 793, 803-04 (D. Minn. 1980) (imposing liability on manufacturer of defective CB radios
notwithstanding lack of vertical privity); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 289-
92 (Alaska 1976) (allowing purchaser of mobile home to sue manufacturer for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability); Peterson v. North Am. Plant Breeders, 354 N.W.2d 625, 631-32
(Neb. 1984) (allowing suit for breach of implied warranty of merchantability to be brought
against seed company in absence of vertical privity); Dalton v. Stanley Solar & Stove, Inc., 629
A.2d 794, 797 (N.H. 1993) (holding that no privity was required under Alternative C for suit by
ultimate consumer against manufacturer of wood stove).
138. See Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1159-60 (D. Or. 1989) (concluding
that patient who received defective IUD could sue manufacturer notwithstanding lack of vertical
privity); Bishop v. Sales, 336 So. 2d 1340, 1344 (Ala. 1976) (declaring that vertical privity was
unnecessary in personal injury cases); Perfetti v. McGhan Med. Ctr., 662 P.2d 646, 655 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that vertical privity was not needed for injured patient to sue manufacturer
of implant). But see Thomaston v. Fort Wayne Pools, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that manufacturer of swinming pool kit was not liable to personal injury victim
who was not in privity with manufacturer); Williams v. Fulmer, 695 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Ky. 1985)
(refusing to allow implied warranty claim by injured consumer against manufacturer of motorcy-
cle helmet in absence of vertical privity).
139. See Tamura, Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1065, 1069-70 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (hold-
ing that remote buyer could sue manufacturer of defective cassette tape deck which caused prop-
erty damage from fire); Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (Pa. 1968) (announcing that
vertical privity would no longer be necessary in implied warranty cases where property damage
occurred). But see Wear v. Chenault Motor Co., Inc., 293 So. 2d 298, 301 (Ala. Ct. App. 1974)
(concluding that suit against automobile manufacturer for property damage was barred for lack
of vertical privity).
140. Section 2-318, Alternative A, provides that:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A (1989).
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adopted this version. 141 Alternative B, which prevails in six states and the
Virgin Islands, 142 extends warranty protection to any natural person who suf-
fers personal injury and who may be expected to use, consume or be affected
by the goods.143 Alternative C, enacted in eight states, 144 provides that an
express or implied warranty may extend to any person, including business
entities, who may use, consume or be affected by the product.1 4 5 This means
that Alternative C, unlike Alternatives A and B, is not limited to personal
injury cases, but applies to economic loss cases as well.
The courts have applied the privity requirements of section 2-318 to both
express warranty and implied warranty claims. Thus, family members and
other protected parties have been allowed to bring express warranty claims
against immediate or remote sellers, 146 while the express warranty claims of
others generally have been rejected. 14 7 Likewise, the courts usually have re-
quired horizontal privity in implied warranty cases involving economic
loss. 14 8 However, horizontal privity requirements also have been enforced in
implied warranty cases involving personal injury or property damage.
149
141. These jurisdictions include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Colum-
bia, Florida (with the addition of employees), Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 131, at 392 n.3.
142. These include Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, New York, Vermont and the
Virgin Islands. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 131, at 393 n.6.
143. Section 2-318, Alternative B, provides that: "A seller's warranty whether express or
implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section." U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative B (1989).
144. These include Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 131, at 393 n.7.
145. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C, provides that:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reason-
ably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by
breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C (1989).
146. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Minn. 1976) (allowing
homeowner whose daughter purchased Christmas tree from seller to sue under express warranty
for property damage caused by fire).
147. See Keith v. Stoelting, Inc., 915 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that express
warranty claim by employee of purchaser against manufacturer of polygraph machine was
barred by lack of horizontal privity).
148. See id. (holding that lack of horizontal privity between employer and dismissed em-
ployee barred implied warranty claim against manufacturer of polygraph machine); Chandler v.
Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818, 822 (Ala. 1976) (finding sufficient horizontal privity between buyer of
mobile home and ex-wife of buyer to permit breach of warranty action by ex-wife against
manufacturer).
149. See Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to allow college
football player to sue football helmet manufacturer because of lack of horizontal privity between
victim and purchaser of helmet); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (E.D.
Pa. 1969) (denying recovery by injured passenger against manufacturer of automobile due to
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Many of these cases involved employees. Although employees have occa-
sionally been allowed to bring implied warranty claims against product man-
ufacturers, 150 most of the time they have failed because of a lack of
horizontal privity, at least in states that have adopted Alternative A.
151
B. The Notice Requirement
Section 2-607 (3)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a
buyer who accepts tender must notify the seller within a reasonable time that
the goods are defective. 152 The purpose of the notice provision is to give the
seller an opportunity to inspect the goods,153 and to repair or replace the
goods if they are defective. 1 54 It also allows the seller time to negotiate with
lack of horizontal privity); Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 393 S.E.2d 64, 68 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that passenger injured when gasoline ignited on motorcycle could not bring suit
against manufacturer of motorcycle); Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 500 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1986) (denying claim by injured transmission shop customer against manufacturer of air
compressor); Crews v. W.A. Brown & Sons, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 924, 929-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(ruling that injured church member could not bring implied warranty claim against manufacturer
of walk-in freezer due to lack of horizontal privity between him and church).
150. See Carlson v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1073, 1077-78 (S.D. Fla.
1987) (allowing employees to sue asbestos manufacturer because state's version of § 2-318 spe-
cifically included employees within class of third-party beneficiaries); Williams v. West Penn
Power Co., 467 A.2d 811, 816 (Pa. 1983) (allowing suit by employee against manufacturer of
ladder platform hoist notwithstanding lack of privity).
151. See Watkins v. Barber-Colman Co., 625 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that
lack of privity barred employee from bringing suit against cotton machine manufacturer); An-
derson v. Watling Ladder Co., 472 F.2d 576, 577 (6th Cir. 1973) (ruling that lack of horizontal
privity barred suit by employee against manufacturer of defective ladder); Bailey v. ITT Grinnel
Corp., 536 F. Supp. 84, 89 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that lack of horizontal privity prevented
employee from suing manufacturer of punch press); Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F.
Supp. 337, 345-46 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (recommending refusing to permit suit by employee against
manufacturer of "fifth wheel" device on tractor-trailer); Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Ctr.,
Inc., 733 P.2d 870, 871-72 (N.M. 1987) (finding that no liability existed on the part of dump truck
manufacturer for injuries sustained by employee of purchaser); Bruns v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 605
N.E.2d 395, 397 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that employee was not a third-party beneficiary
under § 2-318 and, therefore, could not seek damages for personal injuries from ball peen ham-
mer manufacturer); Hester v. Purex Corp., Ltd., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975) (prohibiting
employee who inhaled toxic fumes from bringing implied warranty claim against manufacturer
of solvent); Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 739 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)
(concluding that employee was barred from bringing suit against manufacturer of punch press).
152. U.C.C. § 2-607 (3)(a) (1989). This provision provides: "Where a tender has been ac-
cepted: (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered
any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy ... ." Id.
153. See General Matters, Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) ("The notice requirement also protects the seller's right to inspect the goods.").
154. See Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 409 (8th Cir. 1985)
("The first [purpose of the notice requirement] is to enable the seller to make adjustments or
replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure.").
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the buyer 155 and to prepare for litigation.15 6 Finally, the notice requirement
helps to protect sellers against stale claims.
157
In any action against the seller for breach of warranty, the buyer must
allege and prove that he or she complied with the Code's notice require-
ments' 58 and one who fails to do so will lose the right to sue the seller for
breach of warranty. 159 Notice is usually given in writing; however, the buyer
also may inform the seller orally,' 60 or by other appropriate means,' 6' that
the goods are defective. In addition, notice of breach must be communicated
to the seller within a reasonable time after receipt of the goods.' 62 Finally,
some courts insist that the buyer specifically charge the seller with breach of
155. See Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826 (6th Cir. 1978)
("[E]xpress notice opens the way for settlement through negotiation between the parties.");
Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 512 (Alaska 1980) ("The over-
riding purpose of the notice requirement is to encourage consistent business practices and early
settlement of disputes.").
156. See Courtesy Enters. v. Richards Lab., 457 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
("[N]otice should be provided to allow the seller to prepare for negotiation, and litigation.");
Riley v. Ken Wilson Ford, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 717, 721 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("Also, the seller must
have a reasonable opportunity to discover facts and prepare for negotiation and his defense to a
lawsuit.").
157. See L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Ark. 1969) ("The purpose
of the statutory requirement of notice to the seller of breach of warranty is ... to give the seller
some immunity against stale claims."); Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 661 (Colo. 1980)
("[N]otice provides the seller a safeguard against stale claims being asserted after it is too late
for the manufacturer or seller to investigate them.").
158. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (11th
Cir. 1983) ("The buyer bears the burden of showing that he gave the required notice within a
reasonable time."); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 273 S.E.2d 681, 683 (N.C. 1981) ("Thus, the
burden of pleading and proving that seasonable notification has been given is on the buyer").
159. See Point Adams Packing Co. v. Astoria Maine Constr. Co., 594 F.2d 763, 765-66 (9th
Cir. 1979) (concluding that failure to provide adequate notice by buyer of boat which sank
barred suit against boatbuilder); Romedy v. Willett Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 220 S.E.2d 74, 75 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that delay in notification by buyer of automobile to dealer was un-
reasonable and, hence, suit against dealer was barred).
160. See Stelco Indus. v. Cohen, 438 A.2d 759, 761-62 (Conn. 1980) (holding that oral com-
plaints by buyer of building materials to various employees of seller constituted adequate no-
tice); Oregon Lumber Co. v. Dwyer Overseas Timber Prods., 571 P.2d 884, 887 (Or. 1977)
(concluding that oral notification of seller was sufficient to comply with section 2-607); Vintage
Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (ruling that oral expression
of dissatisfaction with quality of mobile home communicated to seller's repairmen was sufficient
notice).
161. See Cancun Adventure Tours, Inc. v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 F.2d 1044, 1047
(4th Cir. 1988) (shipping air compressor back to seller with complaint that it was overheating
found to constitute effective notice); Overland Bond & Investment Co. v. Howard, 292 N.E.2d
168, 176 (I11. Ct. App. 1972) (concluding that buyer's act of towing used car to dealer's lot and
informing employee that it needed further repairs was sufficient notice); Ragland Mills, Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 763 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (returning damaged automobile
to dealer's lot found to constitute adequate notice).
162. See White v. Mississippi Order Buyers, 648 P.2d 682, 684 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (hold-
ing that notice given thirty-four days after delivery of cattle was unreasonable under the
circumstances).
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contract, 163 although others merely require that the buyer inform the seller
that the goods are unsatisfactory in some respect and that further action by
the seller will be required.
164
The Code's notice requirements appear to work well in commercial
transactions between experienced and knowledgeable parties. However, the
Code's notice requirements have sometimes proved to be "booby traps for
the unwary" 165 when they have been enforced too strictly against ordinary
consumers. 166 The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code tacitly ac-
knowledged the existence of this problem when they declared that the pur-
pose of section 2-607 was to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive
consumers who act in good faith of their remedies.
167
Over the years, courts have employed a number of techniques to amelio-
rate the harshness of the notice requirement where injured consumers are
involved. For example, many courts hold ordinary consumers to a more re-
laxed standard of compliance with notice requirements than commercial buy-
ers. 168 In addition, a few courts have ruled that filing a lawsuit is sufficient
163. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 973 (5th Cir.
1976) ("[It is not enough under section 2-607 that a seller has knowledge of the facts constitut-
ing a nonconforming tender; he must also be informed that the buyer considers him to be in
breach of the contract."); Cotner v. International Harvester Co., 545 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Ark. 1977)
("[Niotice must be more than a complaint. It must, either directly or inferentially, inform the
seller that the buyer demands damages upon an asserted claim of breach of warranty.").
164. See T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 359 (5th Cir. 1980) ("It
is well established that 'notice under section 2-607 need not be a specific claim for damages or an
assertion of legal rights."'); American Fertilizer Specialists, Inc. v. Wood, 635 P.2d 592, 596
(Okla. 1981) ("[Notice] is sufficient if it is informative to the seller of the general nature of the
difficulty encountered with the warranted goods."); Petro-Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
686 P.2d 589, 592 (Wyo. 1984) ("The general rule is that notification is sufficient if the seller is
informed that the transaction is still troublesome and that the transaction is claimed to involve a
breach thus opening the way for normal settlements though negotiation.").
165. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962). See Prosser, supra
note 1, at 1130 (discussing how courts deal with troublesome requirement of Sales Act which
provides that a buyer cannot recover on warranty unless he gives notice of breach to seller
within reasonable time).
166. See, e.g., Branden v. Gerbie, 379 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (barring suit by in-
jured IUD user against manufacturer because of fifteen-month delay in notification); Fischer v.
Mead Johnson Lab., 341 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (declaring that oral contraceptive
user's personal injury claim was barred because of failure to notify manufacturer prior to filing
suit); San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 248 A.2d 778, 782 (R.I. 1968) (holding that
as matter of law eight-month delay in notifying retailer was unreasonably long).
167. See Morris G. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Bar-
riers, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 5, 28 (1965); see also Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 463 (Alaska
1983) ("A consumer unfamiliar with commercial practices should not be barred from pursuing
meritorious claim because he was unaware of need to notify remote seller of breach before
bringing suit."); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 273 S.E.2d 681, 685 (N.C. 1981) ("Fairness to the
consumer dictates that he be given a reasonable time to learn of and to comply with this require-
ment."); Riley v. Ken Wilson Ford, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 717, 721 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("[A] con-
sumer acting in good faith should not be deprived of a remedy.").
168. See Cancun Adventure Tours, Inc. v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 F.2d 1044, 1047
(4th Cir. 1988) ("In addition, retail consumers-i.e. those who buy the item for their own use
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notice to comply with the Code's requirements. 169 Furthermore, some courts
have determined that the buyer is not obliged to notify anyone but his or her
immediate seller that the goods are defective. 170 It is assumed that the seller,
once notified, will inform the next party in the distributive chain, thereby
ensuring that the manufacturer will ultimately be notified of the problem. 171
Other courts, however, have insisted that the victim notify all parties against
whom a breach of warranty claim will be made. 172 Finally, a respectable
number of courts have concluded that third-party beneficiaries under section
2-318 do not have to comply with the notice requirements of section 2-607.173
rather than for resale in the course of business-are held to a lesser standard of notice than are
merchant buyers.").
169. See Shooshanian, 672 P.2d at 462 (holding complaint filed by retail consumer against
mobile home manufacturer sufficient to satisfy notice requirement); see also Pace v. Sagebrush
Sales Co., 560 P.2d 789, 792 (Ariz. 1977) (declaring that pleadings could constitute notice if suit
was brought within reasonable time). But see Parrillo v. Giroux Co., Inc., 426 A.2d 1313, 1317
(R.I. 1981) (finding filing of lawsuit by injured consumer not sufficient to comply with code's
notice provisions).
170. See Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 661 (Colo. 1980) (holding that purchaser
of defective farm equipment satisfied notice requirement by promptly informing dealer of prob-
lem); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (finding user of
oral contraceptives, who suffered stroke, was only required to notify her immediate seller); Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 452 A.2d 192, 198 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), affd, 456
A.2d 930 (Md. 1983) (concluding that buyer of tire for tractor-trailer rig was not required to
notify tire manufacturer).
171. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 206 (Colo. 1984) ("When consumer's
notice of breach is given to his immediate seller, such person to preserve any right of action for
breach of warranty will give notice to his immediate seller and so on upstream."); Ragland Mills,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 763 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring that notice to
immediate seller inures to benefit of manufacturer); Seaside Resorts, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., 416
S.E.2d 655, 664 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that sellers will notify others in distributive chain in
order to preserve their rights).
172. See Carlson v. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 1248, 1256 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that farmer who suffered crop loss because of defective herbicide was required to
notify manufacturer before bringing suit); Redfield v. Mead Johnson & Co., 512 P.2d 776, 781
(Or. 1973) (declaring that injured oral contraceptive user must notify manufacturer in order to
bring breach of warranty action); Wilcox v. Hillcrest Mem'l Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1985) (barring suit by buyer of defective casket who notified retail seller but not
casket manufacturer).
173. See McKneely v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to require
employee injured by defective winch to notify manufacturer); Carlson v. Armstrong World In-
dus., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (finding employee, as third party beneficiary,
was not required to notify asbestos manufacturer that products were defective); Taylor v. Ameri-
can Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that plaintiff injured in
motorcycle accident was third party beneficiary and, therefore, not required to notify manufac-
turer); Clemco Indus. v. Johnson, 368 So. 2d 509, 513-15 (Ala. 1979) (declaring that employees of
sandblasting company do not have to notify manufacturer of sandblasting hoods in order to
bring suit against it); Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71, 73-74 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965)
(declaring that social guest of buyer, injured while riding bicycle, was not buyer and, therefore,
not required to notify seller of the defect); Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 368 A.2d 993, 996-97 (Md. 1977)
(ruling that employee injured by defective automotive alignment machine was not required to
notify manufacturer); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460, 464 (Md. 1971) (holding
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C. Disclaimers and Warranty Limitations
A disclaimer is a provision in a sales contract that prevents a warranty
from arising; 174 a warranty limitation, on the other hand, restricts the reme-
dies available to the injured party if a breach occurs.175 Both of these devices
are commonly used by sellers to shift product-related risks from themselves
to the purchasers of their products.
Section 2-316 permits a seller to disclaim warranties if certain require-
ments are satisfied. Generally speaking, express warranties cannot be dis-
claimed if this would create a conflict between two contractual provisions. 176
However, a seller can disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness. To exclude an implied warranty of merchantability, section 2-316
(2)177 provides that the disclaimer must be conspicuous 17 8 and must ex-
pressly refer to merchantability. 179 Disclaimers of fitness warranties also
that third-party beneficiary does not have to notify automobile manufacturer in order to sue for
breach of implied warranty).
174. See Prosser, supra note 107, at 157 ("A disclaimer is a refusal of the seller to
warrant.").
175. See Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, supra note 77, at
1289 ("Warranty limitations, on the other hand, do not prevent warranties from arising; rather
they allow sellers to narrow the scope of their potential liability under existing warranties.").
176. See Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 412-13 (8th Cir.
1985) (declaring disclaimer to be inconsistent with express warranty given by seller of power
transmission tower components); Limited Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 56-57 (8th Cir.
1980) (concluding that "as is" clause in contract for sale of used airplane did not exclude express
warranty that plane was airworthy); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774, 782-83 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding that general disclaimer was not effective to exclude express warranty that
automatic car wash could be coin operated); Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 264 N.W.2d 374, 384
(Minn. 1978) (ruling that express warranty with respect to carryover characteristics of herbicide
overrode general disclaimer); Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 319 N.W.2d 855, 859-60 (Wis.
1982) (finding disclaimer to be inconsistent with express warranty given in connection with sale
of grain drying bin). A seller, however, can place time limits or other restrictions on the scope of
an express warranty. See, e.g., Abraham v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d 238, 250 (2d Cir.
1986) (upholding time/mileage limitation on express warranty); Tracey v. Vinton Motors, Inc.,
296 A.2d 269, 271 (Vt. 1972) (concluding that 30-day/1000-mile limitation in connection with sale
of used car was effective).
177. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2) (1989). This provision provides: "Subject to subsection (3), to ex-
clude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in the case of a writing must be conspicuous." Id.
178. See Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 909 (D. Minn. 1985) (concluding
that disclaimer on back of contract for sale of animal feed storage system was not conspicuous);
Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Cos., 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (11. Ct. App. 1980) (ruling that dis-
claimer printed on back of contract to sell breeding pigs was not conspicuous); Zabriskie Chev-
rolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195, 199 (N.J. Super. 1968) (ruling that fine print disclaimer on
back of sales contract was not conspicuous); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d
1009, 1012 (Utah 1976) (holding that disclaimer which appeared in fine print on back of contract
for sale of mobile home was not conspicuous and, therefore, not effective). But see Hahn v. Ford
Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (finding written modification of warranty
for new automobile to be conspicuous).
179. See McCormick Mach., Inc. v. Julian E. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 523 So. 2d 651, 653-54
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that disclaimer in connection with sale of used bulldozer
was ineffective because it failed to mention merchantability); Lee v. Peterson, 716 P.2d 1373,
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must be conspicuous, but no particular language is required to make a valid
disclaimer. 180
Section 2-316 (3)(a) permits a seller to disclaim implied warranties by
selling the product "as is" or "with all faults. ' 181 The courts generally have
allowed sellers of used products to disclaim liability by using such terms,
182
even when the product has caused personal injuries.' 83 However, the courts
have consistently refused to apply the provisions of section 2-316 (3)(a) to
new products.'
84
Section 2-316 (3)(b) states that no implied warranties arise with respect
to defects that can be discovered by inspection if the seller requests the buyer
to inspect the goods and the seller either inspects the goods or declines to do
so.' 8 5 Thus, a buyer who has inspected (or has been asked to inspect) goods
before purchasing them cannot rely on the seller to protect against discovera-
1375-76 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (holding disclaimer by seller of defective copier machine to be
effective because of failure to mention merchantability); Agrarian Grain Co., Inc. v. Meeker, 526
N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding disclaimer by seller of grain bins to be ineffec-
tive because it did not refer to merchantability); Wright v. T & B Auto Sales, Inc., 325 S.E.2d
.493, 495-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that disclaimer by seller of used car was invalid be-
cause it failed to mention merchantability); P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Nat'l Gas Co., 568
P.2d 1273, 1278 (Okla. 1977) (refusing to give effect to attempted disclaimer of implied warranty
of merchantability because disclaimer failed to mention merchantability).
180. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2) (1989). This provision declares that: "[T]o exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be in writing and conspicuous. Language to ex-
clude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."' Id.
181. Id. § 2-316 (3)(a). This provision declares that: "[U]nless the circumstances indicate
otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warran-
ties and makes it plain that there is no implied warranty." Id.
182. See Pell City Wood, Inc. v. Forke Bros. Auctioneers, Inc., 474 So. 2d 694, 695-96 (Ala.
1985) (ruling that sale of used truck "as is" effectively disclaimed implied warranties); O'Neill v.
International Harvester Co., 575 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that sale of used
truck "as is" was sufficient to disclaim all implied warranties); Pelc v. Simmons, 620 N.E.2d 12,
15 (I11. Ct. App. 1993) (declaring that "as is" sticker on used car was sufficient to disclaim im-
plied warranties); De Voe Chevrolet-Cadillac. Inc. v. Cartwright, 526 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988) (finding that used car sold "as is" was not warranted); Ace, Inc. v. Maynard, 423
S.E.2d 504, 509 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that sale of used airplane "as is" effectively
disclaimed all implied warranties).
183. See Masker v. Smith, 405 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that sale of
used car "as is" excused seller from liability for personal injuries suffered as result of brake
failure). But see Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1084-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (declar-
ing that sale of used motorcycle "as is" did not necessarily exclude implied warranties where
personal injuries were involved).
184. See Gaylord v. Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc., 477 So. 2d 382, 383 (Ala. 1985) (holding
that sale of new mobile home "as is" did not exclude implied warranty of merchantability).
185. U.C.C. § 2-316 (3)(b) (1989). This provision provides:
[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him.
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ble defects; 186 such a buyer, however, still may maintain a breach of warranty
claim for latent defects that could not have been discovered by a reasonable
inspection.
187
Finally, section 2-316 (3)(c) provides that implied warranties can be dis-
claimed by course of dealing or trade usage.' 88 Thus, either a course of deal-
ing between the parties themselves' 89 or usage of the trade in general1 90 may
prevent implied warranties from arising.
Lest sellers be unduly tempted to take advantage of less sophisticated
buyers, the courts and the Code have placed some limitations on the power
to disclaim liability for defective goods. For example, in order for a dis-
claimer to be effective, the seller must communicate the substance of the
disclaimer to the purchaser prior to the time of sale;' 91 a disclaimer cannot be
imposed on the buyer after the sale has been completed.192 Furthermore,
some courts' 93 will invalidate disclaimers that comply with the formal re-
186. See David v. Davenport, 656 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (declaring that
inspection of used car by buyer's agent would preclude claim for breach of implied warranty);
Cardwell v. Hackett, 579 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that there was no
implied warranty as to defects in mobile home that were apparent to buyer who examined prod-
uct twice before purchase); Richards Mfg. Co. v. Gamel, 489 P.2d 366, 367 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
(holding that commercial buyer of lamps, who inspected merchandise before buying, should
have discovered defects). But see Holm v. Hansen, 248 N.W.2d 503, 510 (Iowa 1971) (finding
that §2-316 (3)(b) did not apply if seller did not ask buyer to inspect goods).
187. See Twin Lakes Mfg. Co. v. Coffey, 281 S.E.2d 864, 866-67 (Va. 1981) (finding no
waiver of implied warranty with respect to latent defects which could not have been discovered
by careful inspection of mobile home).
188. U.C.C. § 2-316 (3)(c) (1989). This provision provides: "[An implied warranty can also
be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade." Id.
189. See Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164, 185-86
(D. Conn. 1984) (concluding that sixty-two year course of dealing between parties made it clear
to buyer that structural steel was being sold without any implied warranties).
190. See Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors, 521 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Mont. 1974) (finding sale of
used combine to be without warranties according to trade usage); R.D. Lowrance, Inc. v. Peter-
son, 178 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Neb. 1970) (declaring that usage of trade prevented implied warran-
ties relating to health of cattle from arising); Kincheloe v. Geldmeier, 619 S.W.2d 272, 274-75
(Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that custom among cattle buyers was that cattle purchased at
auction were sold without any implied warranties).
191. See Wright v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 845 F. Supp. 503,511 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding
that disclaimers on pesticide labels were not effective against homeowners who never had chance
to see them).
192. See Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 963, 968-71 (D. Mass.
1993) (declaring that disclaimer received by purchaser after sale of goods not part of bargain);
Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 922 (Mont. 1977) ("A disclaimer or limitation of
warranty contained in a manufacturer's manual received by the purchaser subsequent to the sale
does not limit recovery for implied or express warranties made prior to or at the time of sale.").
193. See Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that
disclaimer and limitation provisions used by all producers of cabbage seed were unconsciona-
ble); Schmaltz v. Nissin, 431 N.W.2d 657, 661-62 (S.D. 1988) (finding disclaimer and limitation
provision in contract for sale of seed to be unconscionable). But see Arthur A. Leff, Unconscio-
nability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (arguing that
disclaimers that meet the formal requirements of §2-316 should not be invalidated on general
unconscionability grounds); Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, supra note 77,
1998] REPLACING STRICT LIABILITY
quirements of section 2-316 on the theory that they are unconscionable under
the provisions of section 2-302 (1).194
The Code also permits sellers to limit remedies that would otherwise be
available for breach of warranty. 195 For example, the parties may agree that
the buyer's remedies shall be limited to repair or replacement of defective
goods.196 Another common practice is to exclude damages for consequential
losses if the goods are not up to par.1 97 At the same time, the Code provides
that a limitation may be declared ineffective if it causes the warranty to "fail
of its essential purpose. ' 198 In other words, a seller cannot offer warranty
protection in one part of the contract and then vitiate it completely by unrea-
sonably limiting the remedies available to the buyer if a breach of warranty
occurs. Moreover, courts have interpreted this provision liberally in order to
protect buyers, especially in consumer sales transactions. 199 In addition, the
Code provides that attempts to limit liability for personal injuries is prima
at 216 ("The Code's explicit authorization of implied warranty disclaimers suggests that courts
are not free to brand such clauses substantively unconscionable.").
194. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1) (1989). This provision provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
195. Id. § 2-719 (1). This provision provides:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the preceding
section on liquidation and limitation of damages:
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recover-
able under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts;
and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
Id.
196. See Jonathan A. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Meta-
physics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. RE~v. 28, 61 (1977).
197. U.C.C. § 2-719 (3) (1989). This provision provides, in relevant part, that: "Conse-
quential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconsciona-
ble." Id.
198. Id. § 2-719 (2). This provision provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act." Id.
199. See Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding jury verdict
that limitations in new car warranty caused it to fail of its essential purpose); Liberty Truck Sales,
Inc. v. Kimbrel, 548 So. 2d 1379, 1384 (Ala. 1989) (holding that repair or replace limitation failed
of its essential purpose since seller was unable to repair truck); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp.,
226 N.W.2d 157, 161 (S.D. 1975) (concluding that unreasonable delays in repairing new car
caused available remedy to fail of its essential purpose). But see Middletown Eng'g Co. v. Cli-
mate Conditioning Co., 810 S.W.2d 57, 59-60 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no failure of essential
purpose even though seller took 126 days to repair product).
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facie unconscionable, 200 and courts routinely invalidate such limitations un-
less the seller can rebut this presumption.
20 1
D. Statute of Limitations
Statutes of limitation prescribe the period during which the plaintiff can
bring suit once a cause of action has accrued. 20 2 Section 2-725 (1) establishes
a four-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty claims. 20 3 The Code
allows the parties to shorten the statutory period in their original agree-
ment;20 4 however, they may not extend the limitation period beyond the four
years permitted by section 2-725 (1).205
A major concern with statutes of limitations is determining when a cause
of action accrues. The accrual period in tort actions usually starts at the time
the injury occurs, although if the injury is a latent one, the cause of action
ordinarily accrues when the injury was, or should have been, first discov-
ered.20 6 In contrast, section 2-725 (2) declares that a cause of action for
200. U.C.C. § 2-719 (3) (1989). This provision provides: "Consequential damages may be
limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." Id.
201. See Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that seller
failed to rebut presumption that limitation on consequential damages in automobile sales con-
tract was unconscionable); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 430 S.W.2d 778, 781-82 (Ark. 1968) (charac-
terizing truck manufacturer's disclaimer as unconscionable to extent that it applied to personal
injuries); Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16, 18 (N.J. 1974) (declaring that limitation of conse-
quential damages was unconscionable when driver of automobile was killed by tire blowout);
Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Okla. 1978) (invalidating limitation of
remedy in personal injury case on grounds of unconscionability); see also Gladden v. Cadillac
Motor Car Division, 416 A.2d 394, 402 (N.J. 1980) (refusing to give effect to limitation provision
in contract for sale of new car when purchaser suffered property damage).
202. See Josephine H. Hicks, Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism
Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REV. 627, 629 (1985).
203. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1) (1989). This provision provides: "An action for breach of any con-
tract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the
original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but
may not extend it." Id.
204. See Shur-Value Stamps, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 50 F.3d 592, 599 (8th Cir. 1995)
(giving effect to one-year limitation period in contract for sale of resin); Standard Alliance Indus.
v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 821 (6th Cir. 1978) (upholding one-year limitation period);
Aceros Industriales, S.A. de C.V. v. Florida Steel Corp., 528 F. Supp. 1156, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(concluding that one-year limitation period in contract for sale of steel billets was valid); Snyder
v. Gallagher Truck Ctr., 453 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (declaring that claim by
purchaser of tractor was subject to one-year limitation period); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
Ferranti-Packard Transformers, Inc., 597 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (upholding two-
year limitation period on sale of electrical transformers); Jandreau v. Sheesley Plumbing & Heat-
ing Co., 324 N.W.2d 266, 270-71 (S.D. 1982) (validating one-year limitation period in contract for
sale of irrigation equipment); Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, 658 S.W.2d 106, 110-11
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding twelve month, 12,000 mile warranty for motor home).
205. See Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1327 (1987).
206. See Andrew R. Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadel Continues: An Analy-
sis of the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose in Products Liability, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 449,
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breach of warranty accrues when the breach occurs, usually when the goods
are first tendered for delivery. 20 7 However, the Code provides an exception
to the four-year limitation period in the case of warranties relating to future
performance. 20 8 If the seller explicitly warrants the future performance of
the goods, the limitation period will not begin to run until the buyer discov-
ers, or should have discovered, the defect.20 9 An example of a warranty of
future performance is one that warrants the product for a specified period of
time. 210 It should be noted, however, that courts generally require a war-
ranty regarding future performance to be made in very explicit terms.2 11 In
addition, courts almost uniformly refuse to apply the future performance ex-
ception to implied warranties because such warranties cannot explicitly apply
to future performance.
212
There is a split of authority over when a breach of warranty claim ac-
crues when the victim has suffered a nonpecuniary loss. Most courts have
455-56 (1981) ("The modern rule, often termed the 'discovery rule,' is that the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until an injury is or should have been discovered.").
207. U.C.C. § 2-725 (2) (1989). This provision provides:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's
lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery
is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause
of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
Id.
208. Id.
209. See Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 157 (Alaska 1984) (stat-
ing that when seller warranted future performance of used diesel generator, cause of action
accrued at time defect was, or should have been, discovered); Executone Bus. Sys. Corp. v. IPC
Communications, Inc., 442 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring that limitation
period would begin to run from day defect was, or should have been, discovered).
210. See Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820-21 (6th Cir.
1978) ("If a seller expressly warrants a product for a specified number of years, it is clear that, by
this action alone, he is explicitly warranting the future performance of the product or goods for
that period of time."); Snyder v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 955, 958 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
("A warranty extends to future performance when the warranty explicitly provides that the
goods will be free from defects for a specific period of time.").
211. See Economy Hous. Co. v. Continental Forest Prods., 805 F.2d 319, 320-21 (8th Cir.
1986) (requiring explicit reference to future performance in contract for sale of plywood siding);
R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1983) (declaring that
warranty of future performance must be clearly stated); Rutland v. Swift Chem. Co., 351 So. 2d
324, 325-26 (Miss. 1977) (holding that promise of future performance of fertilizer must be
explicit).
212. See Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that
implied warranty, which arose in connection with sale of milking machinery for dairy farm, could
not relate to future performance); May v. AC & S, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 934, 944 (E.D. Mo. 1993)
(declaring that implied warranty of merchantability associated with sale of asbestos products
cannot extend to future performance); Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Sargent & Green-
leaf, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 680, 689 (D.R.I. 1992) (concluding that no promises concerning future
performance of railroad switchblock would arise in connection with implied warranties); Murphy
v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 481 N.W.2d 422, 430 (Neb. 1992) (holding that future performance
exception only applies to express warranties).
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concluded that section 2-725 governs both personal injury2 13 and property
damage214 claims. These courts have rejected the discovery rule and have
sometimes left injured parties without any remedy.2 15 A smaller group of
courts have decided that a tort statute of limitations should be applied when
the victim has suffered a personal injury, even when the cause of action
213. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (hold-
ing that implied warranty suit by recipient of breast implant was barred by four-year statute of
limitation); Boains v. Lasar Mfg. Co., 330 F. Supp. 1134, 1135 (D. Conn. 1971) (concluding that
claim by employee of purchaser against manufacturer of meat grinding machine was barred by
statute of limitations); Armour v. Alaska Power Auth., 765 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Alaska 1988) (stat-
ing that statute of limitation begins to run when product is purchased, not when injury occurs);
Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154, 158 (Del. 1980) (applying § 2-725 to suit by
injured purchaser of defective tractor); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Genson, 217 S.E.2d 479, 480 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1975) (holding that plaintiff's personal injury claim against glass supplier was barred by § 2-
725); Stoltzner v. American Motors Jeep Corp., 469 N.E.2d 443, 444 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984) (ruling
that § 2-725 applies to breach of warranty claims, including those involving personal injuries);
Fernandez v. Char-Li-Jon, Inc., 888 P.2d 471, 475 (N.M. 1994) (holding that four-year statute of
limitation was applicable to nightclub patron injured by glass in his drink); Heller v. U.S. Suzuki
Motor Co., 477 N.E.2d 434, 436 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that cause of action against motorcycle
manufacturer accrued when manufacturer or distributor tendered delivery of product); Spieker
v. Westgo, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 837, 848 (N.D. 1992) (concluding that four-year statute of limitation
barred suit by accident victim against manufacturer of farm machinery).
214. See Reece v. Homette Corp., 429 S.E.2d 768, 769 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding
that § 2-725 barred claim against seller of mobile home for damage to product itself).
215. See O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting discovery
rule in personal injury suit by DES daughter); Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 877 F. Supp. 8, 14
(D.D.C. 1995) (declining to apply discovery rule in warranty cases); Thomas v. King Ridge, Inc.,
771 F. Supp. 478, 482 (D.N.H. 1991) (refusing to apply discovery rule in personal injury action by
user of defective ski equipment); Brownstein v. Dow Corning Wright, 678 F. Supp. 1151, 1155
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (rejecting discovery rule in personal injury suit by breast implant recipient).
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sounds in warranty.2 16 Finally, a few courts have restricted the application of
section 2-725 (2) to cases where the parties were in privity with each other.
217
V. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CODE
In Part IV, I identified privity, notice, disclaimers, and statutes of limita-
tion as potential problem areas. In this portion of the article, I will consider
what changes should be made, if any, in the Code to enable it to function as
an effective insurance mechanism for injured consumers.
A. The Privity Requirement
It appears that very few jurisdictions presently require vertical privity
when the injured party brings an express warranty claim against a product
manufacturer. A number of states, however, continue to enforce vertical
privity requirements against injured consumers who bring implied warranty
claims against remote sellers. These vertical privity requirements make no
sense in personal injury cases because they require the injured party to sue
the retailer instead of the real party in interest, the manufacturer. Such suits
are wasteful because the retailer must in turn implead his or her immediate
216. See Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1043 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying time-of-
injury approach to personal injury claim against truck manufacturer); Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield,
625 F.2d 1095, 1105 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that personal injury statute of limitation, not § 2-
725, should apply to claim by injured employee against seller of chain hoist); Tyler v. R.R. Street
& Co., 322 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Va. 1971) (stating that two-year personal injury statute of
limitation was applicable to breach of warranty claim against seller of chemical spot remover);
Becker v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 125 Cal. Rptr. 326, 331 (Ca. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that
one-year personal injury statute of limitation was applicable to accident victim's claim against
car manufacturer); Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 1981) (applying discovery rule
in personal injury case); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 421 (N.J. 1973) (concluding
that personal injury statute of limitation applies to suit by injured party against truck tire manu-
facturer); Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Crosby Valve & Gage Co., 627 N.E.2d 552, 555 (Ohio 1994)
("Therefore, in a products-liability action between sophisticated commercial parties, the charac-
ter of the loss determines the applicable statute of limitations."); Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619
A.2d 429, 431-32 (R.I. 1993) (declaring that personal injury statute of limitation would be used
instead of U.C.C. statute where employee was injured by meat-cutting machine); Taylor v. Ford
Motor Co., 408 S.E.2d 270, 274 (W. Va. 1991) (applying tort statute of limitation instead of § 2-
725 in personal injury actions); see also Lloyd F. Smith Co., Inc. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d
11, 17 (Minn. 1992) (purporting to limit §2-725 to "commercial transactions" between
merchants).
217. See Simmons v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 747, 750-51 (S.D. Ala.
1976) (concluding that cause of action for third party beneficiaries accrued at time of injury),
affd, 560 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1977); Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1367 (I11. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that, in absence of privity, § 2-725 was not applicable to personal injury
claim against supplier of boxcar); Infante v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 371 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502
(App. Div. 1975) (declining to apply § 2-725 to injured plaintiff who was not in privity with
manufacturer of pajamas which caught fire); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck &
Concrete Equip. Co., 257 N.E.2d 380, 384 (Ohio 1970) (concluding that § 2-725 was applicable in
the absence of privity to suit by truck owner whose property was damaged); Plouffe v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 373 A.2d 492, 495 (R.I. 1977) (declaring that § 2-725 was not applicable to
suits by parties who were not in privity with each other).
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vendor. Additional parties in the distributive chain also must be brought into
the litigation if the manufacturer is reached. Thus, what ought to be a simple
dispute between the injured party and the manufacturer instead becomes a
complicated multiparty lawsuit. This is wasteful because each party must in-
cur substantial legal costs even though only the manufacturer ultimately will
pay if the plaintiff wins.
218
The vertical privity requirement is also at odds with the notion that
products liability operates as an insurance mechanism. The insurance theory
assumes that the manufacturer, not the retailer, provides insurance protec-
tion. If this is so, the injured party should be allowed to seek compensation
directly from the insurer, that is, the manufacturer. However, a vertical priv-
ity requirement requires the injured consumer to deal, at least initially, with
an intermediary instead of being able to proceed directly against the
manufacturer.
For these reasons, it seems reasonable to do away with the vertical priv-
ity requirement in personal injury and property damage claims, at least
where ordinary consumers are involved. It also makes sense to bar personal
injury actions against retailers and other intermediaries in cases where manu-
facturers are solvent and subject to suit.
The horizontal privity requirement is somewhat more complicated. At
first blush, it is tempting to eliminate section 2-318 Alternative A, which re-
stricts the scope of horizontal privity to family members and household
guests, and substitute in its stead Alternative B, which defines horizontal
privity broadly enough to include all foreseeable accident victims. This
would allow employees and bystanders to bring warranty claims against
product sellers. A case can be made, however, for retaining the prevailing
horizontal privity rule.
I have argued elsewhere that employees should not be allowed to re-
cover against product sellers because they already are covered by workers
compensation programs. 2 19 In most states, the benefits provided by workers'
compensation statutes constitute the exclusive remedy of an employee
against an employer.220 A worker who has received an award under work-
ers' compensation also can recover against a product seller,22 1 but the em-
218. See Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distribu-
tors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 229 (1987) ("Product retailers, wholesalers,
and distributors, routinely sued in product liability cases, are forced to incur substantial legal
costs to achieve this 'shifting' process.").
219. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-Re-
lated Injuries, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 669, 706-08 (1997).
220. See Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters' Study of Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241, 255 (1993) (stating that employee is statutorily
limited to workers' compensation provisions); Nina G. Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expan-
sion of Occupational Safety and Health Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 969, 971-72 (1987) ("The
exclusive remedy doctrine is at the heart of worker's compensation systems.").
221. See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 919
(1980) ("The employee can file suit against third parties: either the manufacturer of the machine
or the party who supplied it to the employer.").
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ployer is entitled to subrogation for the amount of the workers compensation
award.222 Arguably, it is inefficient to shift losses from one compensation
system to another in this fashion;223 therefore, it might make more economic
sense to exclude employees from the warranty/insurance coverage provided
by product sellers. On the other hand, it might be better to let the parties
resolve the coverage issue by contract. An employer who did not wish to
provide additional protection for employees could expressly exclude them
from warranty/insurance protection.
The other class of victims excluded by Alternative A, but not by Alter-
native B, are bystanders who are not associated in some way with the
buyer.224 The reason bystanders should not be allowed to recover against
product sellers is that they have not purchased the product and, thus, have
not contributed to the insurance fund. Consequently, if the privity barrier is
waived for bystanders, they will be subsidized by those who have purchased
the product. On the other hand, bystanders cannot bargain with the parties
for protection and are essentially helpless victims of risks created by third
parties. As such, they present a strong moral claim to compensation. There
are various ways to deal with the problem of bystanders. One is to permit
them to recover on humanitarian grounds. Because bystander recoveries
would constitute only a tiny fraction of the funds paid to accident victims by
producers, it would not offend our sense of justice very much to give them a
free ride. The other solution is to prohibit bystanders from bringing warranty
claims against product sellers but to allow them to bring negligence actions
instead. I prefer the second alternative.
Notwithstanding the arguments just made against allowing employees
and bystanders to recover, I think that it might be best to eliminate privity
requirements altogether in consumer-related personal injury and property
damage cases. Privity requirements are an unwarranted restriction on the
right of buyers and sellers to allocate risk by private agreement. Parties can
still exclude warranty/insurance coverage by express agreement and do not
have to rely on default rules like privity requirements to achieve this result.
222. See Paul C. Weiler, Workers' Compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a
Tort and Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 836 (1989) ("[I]n all but three jurisdic-
tions ... the employer is given a statutory lien against the employee's tort right to secure reim-
bursement of WC [workers' compensation] benefits that the employer has or will pay to the
injured worker.").
223. See O'Connell, supra note 34, at 441 ("However, as legal and insurance scholars have
been pointing out for years, these so-called subrogation claims, whereby insured losses are
shifted and reshifted in multiple insurance arrangements, always shortchange insureds in the
end, since multiple and expensive layers of insurance are thereby required of everyone.").
224. I assume that customers who are intending to buy a product, but have not yet paid for
it, would be considered buyers and not bystanders. See, e.g., Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores,
65 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Mass. 1946) (holding that customer in self-service grocery store who was
injured by soft drink she was about to purchase would be buyer for purposes of implied war-
ranty); Loch v. Confair, 63 A.2d 24, 26-27 (Pa. 1949) (same).
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B. The Notice Requirement
Section 2-607, the Code's notice provision, is presently applicable to or-
dinary consumers. 225 As mentioned earlier, most courts have relaxed notice
requirements significantly in personal injury cases involving retail purchas-
ers. 226 Moreover, accident victims normally obtain legal assistance immedi-
ately upon injury and lawyers are generally familiar with the Code's notice
provisions even if consumers are not.227 Thus, legitimate claims will seldom
be barred because unwitting consumers fail to comply with the requirements
of section 2-607.
Even so, it might be better to scrap the notice requirement in consumer-
related cases that involve either personal injury or property damage. To be
sure, the notice requirement is useful in commercial transactions. However,
in other cases, the notice requirement does little more than alert the seller to
the fact that a demand for compensation will shortly be forthcoming. Conse-
quently, the notice requirement appears to serve no useful purpose in such
cases and probably ought to be dispensed with.
C. Disclaimers and Limitations
For years proponents of strict liability contended that warranty law was
hostile to consumer interests because it allowed sellers to evade the obliga-
tions imposed upon them by the implied warranty of merchantability.
228
This sort of thinking led the drafters of section 402A to strip sellers of the
right to contract away their duty to provide nondefective products. 229 Some
states have gone further and enacted statutes that bar the use of disclaimers
in certain kinds of warranty actions.230 Such legislation, of course, is in har-
mony with the traditional view that warranty law should require sellers to
meet a minimum standard of product quality and safety as determined by the
implied warranty of merchantability.
225. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1989).
226. See William R. Clement, Jr., Note, Strict Liability and Warranty in Consumer Protec-
tion: The Broader Protection of the UCC in Cases Involving Economic Loss, Used Goods, and
Nondangerous Defective Goods, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1359 (1982) ("Finally, the
UCC's notice requirements put a minimal burden on the consumer, and courts interpret the
notice requirements liberally in favor of consumers.").
227. See Franklin, supra note 119, at 997 ("[W]hen personal injury is involved the victim is
quite likely to see an attorney well within the notice period contemplated by the Code, and it is
unrealistic to fear that the attorney will be unfamiliar with the notice provisions.").
228. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 1, at 1133 ("Commercial buyers are usually quite able to
protect themselves. It is another thing to say that the consumer who buys at retail is to be bound
by a disclaimer which he has never seen, and to which he would certainly not have agreed if he
had known of it, but which defeats a duty imposed by the policy of the law for his protection.").
229. See Clement, supra note 226, at 1351-52 (observing that disclaimers are not recognized
under section 402A).
230. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (2) (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639 (a) (1996);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316 (5) (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1
(1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106 § 2-316A (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9A § 2-316 (5) (1994).
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However, the Code takes a more moderate position on this issue. It
authorizes sellers to disclaim some or all warranties; it also allows sellers to
modify express or implied warranties by, for example, limiting their duration;
and it permits sellers to limit buyers' remedies for breach of warranty.
Although the power to disclaim all warranties appears to be absolute as long
as certain formalities are observed, the Code's other exculpatory devices are
limited by such concepts as "basis of the bargain," "good faith," "fair deal-
ing," and unconscionability.2 31 This allows the parties to a sales contract to
allocate risk between themselves while at the same time protecting consum-
ers against overreaching by sellers.
The use of disclaimers and warranty limitations is essential to the con-
tractual allocation of product-related risks. Sellers who wish to limit their
responsibility to very specific risks must be able to disclaim implied warran-
ties in order to ensure that liability will arise solely from their express under-
takings. Arguably, sellers also should be permitted to limit the duration of
their express warranties and should be allowed to exclude certain types of
damages such as nonpecuniary losses and punitive damages.
All of this suggests that the Code's disclaimer and limitation of remedy
provisions should be left largely intact. However, I would propose that one
modification be made. Section 2-719 (3) provides that limitations of conse-
quential damages for personal injuries are prima facie unconscionable. This
provision is not consistent with a contract-based system of products liability.
There are many situations where the parties may wish to exclude liability for
personal injury without necessarily excluding warranty protection altogether.
Examples of legitimate exclusions of liability include used products, products
that are generically dangerous, like asbestos or cigarettes, products with po-
tential but unknown risks like toxic chemicals or pharmaceuticals, and prod-
ucts that are used in dangerous activities. In addition, sellers should be
allowed to limit their liability for specified uses of the product. Of course,
courts still should be allowed to invalidate contractual limitations on conse-
quential damages if they are found to be unconscionable, but there should be
no presumption of unconscionability in such cases. Consequently, section 2-
719 (3) should be amended to remove the presumption of unconscionability
associated with attempts to limit liability for personal injuries.
D. Statute of Limitations
Tort statutes of limitation are of short duration, typically two years or
less, but they ordinarily do not begin to run until the plaintiff suffers an in-
jury, or in the case of latent injuries, until the plaintiff discovers, or should
have discovered, that an injury has occurred. 232 In contrast, section 2-725 (1)
establishes a four-year statute of limitations for warranty actions under the
231. See Mark A. Kaprelian, Note, Privity Revisited: Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer
for a Defective Product's Self-Inflicted Damage, 84 MICH. L. REv. 517, 534-35 (1985) (pointing
out ameliorative effects of such provisions).
232. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 131, at 405.
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Code,233 and section 2-725 (2) provides that the cause of action accrues when
the warranty is breached, usually at the time of delivery. 234 When section 2-
275 is applied to personal injury and property damage claims, it is possible
that some claims may be barred by the statute of limitations before a buyer
has even been injured. This seems to be unduly harsh and unfair to accident
victims.
The Code's four-year limitation period is especially troublesome where
implied warranty claims are concerned. Because of the nature of implied
warranties, it is not possible for the seller to increase the length of coverage;
consequently, there is no way to prevent section 2-725 from cutting off im-
plied warranty claims after four years. There are really only two options: one
is to retain the existing statute of limitations and let the chips fall where they
may; the other option is to apply a date-of-injury rule to implied warranty
claims involving personal injuries or property damage. My own inclination is
to keep tort rules out of warranty law as much as possible. Accordingly, I
would retain section 2-725 in its present form.
The Code's statute of limitations presents less of a problem in the case of
express warranty claims. This is because a seller who offers an express war-
ranty can explicitly warrant the future performance of the goods, thereby
effectively tolling the statute of limitations. 235 This allows the seller to deter-
mine how long the buyer will be insured against product-related risks. The
length of warranty/insurance protection is important to both buyers and sell-
ers because it affects product prices; for this reason, the parties should be
able to decide this issue for themselves.
CONCLUSION
The existing tort-based system of products liability, when viewed as an
insurance mechanism, is seriously flawed. Under the present approach, prod-
uct sellers are forced to act as insurance providers, but they cannot diversify
risk, segregate insureds according to risk, or take measures to reduce moral
hazard problems. It appears that product sellers could carry out their insur-
ance functions much more efficiently if the current tort-based system was
replaced by a contract-based system such as the Uniform Commercial Code.
If a contract-based products liability regime were established, buyers
and sellers could allocate risk instead of being subjected to a universal and
non-negotiable legal standard. Under this approach, sellers would be al-
lowed to offer buyers, through the use of express warranties and disclaimers,
various levels of warranty/insurance protection. Buyers, in turn, would be
free to shop around for the warranty package that best met their needs. Of
course, I assume that market conditions would force sellers to compete in the
area of warranty protection. I also assume that consumers would make intel-
ligent choices when given the opportunity to choose.
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If such a contract-based system is to be based on the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, certain changes would have to be made. For example, vertical and
horizontal privity requirements would have to be abolished to allow injured
parties to pursue their claims directly against product manufacturers. The
Code's notice requirement also should be waived in such cases. On the other
hand, the Code's disclaimer and warranty limitation provisions should be re-
tained in their present form. The current statute of limitations will not be
particularly troublesome if buyers and sellers rely on express, rather than
upon implied, warranties; this provision, therefore, should be kept in its pres-
ent form.
The contract-based approach outlined in this article is superior in many
respects to the present tort-based system of products liability. Nevertheless,
there is no assurance that it will work in the real world. Market forces may
not be strong enough to generate legitimate choices for consumers, and con-
sumers may not behave rationally if they are given choices. Nevertheless, I
believe that contract-based alternatives to strict products liability merit seri-
ous consideration.
